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Direct Action and the Struggle
for Integration
By MuLorm Q. Smri.y*
A MOST striking aspect of the integration struggle in the United
States is the role of non-violent direct action. To an extent unsurpassed
in history,1 men's attentions have been directed to techniques which
astonish, perturb, and sometimes antagonize those familiar only with
the more common and orthodox modes of social conflict. Because non-
violent direct action is so often misunderstood, it should be seen
against a broad background. The civil rights struggle, to be sure, is
central. But we shall examine that struggle in the light of general
history and the over-all theory of non-violent resistance. Thus we begin
by noting the role of non-violent direct action in human thought and
experience. We then turn to its part in the American tradition, par-
ticularly in the battle for race equality; examine its theory and illus-
trate it in twentieth-century experience; inquire into its legitimacy
and efficacy; raise several questions crucial to the problem of civil
disobedience, which is one of its expressions; and assess its role in the
future battle for equality and integration.
Direct Action in Human Thought and Experience
Although non-violent direct action is a kind of "war,"2 it seeks to
avoid the violence of war and still reject acquiescence in social
injustice. Historically, it has often been used not in pursuance of some
principle, but rather because men in desperation have turned to it as
the only way out.
The Ancient World
The resistance of Moses and the gradually awakening Hebrew
people may be one of the earliest recorded instances. While the with-
A.B., Central State College, Edmond, Oklahoma, 1933; M.A., University of Okla-
homa, 1934; Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1938; faculty of Political Sciences Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1938-1948; Associate Professor and Professor of Political Science,
University of Minnesota, 1948 to present; Visiting Professor of Political Science, Stan-
ford University, 1957-1958; Visiting Professor of Government, Cornell University 1962-
1963.
1 With the possible exception of the battle for India's independence.
2 SHMHA WAn WrrHouT Vsor.aNcu (1939). The title of the volume refers
to Gandhi's techniques, which are discussed throughout the book.
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drawal from Egypt was not to alter social conditions within the ancient
monarchy, its threat may have caused the Egyptian minds to question
whether they ought to redress grievances: by so doing, they might
have retained the labor of the Hebrews, even though eliminating
chattel servitude.3 And it is significant that in American Negro ideol-
ogy, verse, and song, much reference has traditionally been made
to Moses and the ancient Hebrews. Long before the modem liberation
movement, Negroes held up the example of Moses as a model for
themselves.
During the fifth century B.C. occurred another example of direct
and largely non-violent action to redress social wrong. The monarchy
had been abolished in Rome at the end of the sixth century and by
that time the conflict between patricians and plebeians was well under
way. Plebeians found themselves held down not only by the law but
also by the extended social privileges of the patricians. In 494 the ple-
beians withdrew en masse to an adjoining mountain, where they
planned to remain unless granted a greater voice in public affairs. The
patricians, alarmed by this deprivation of soldiers and producers, soon
granted concessions which one modem historian has characterized as
little less than a revolution.4 The withdrawal to the "Sacred Mount"
was the "origin of the tribunate of the plebs,"5 an extremely important
office.
Without mentioning all the non-violent direct action episodes of
ancient life, a useful reference is an instance in the relations between
the largely disarmedJews and the heavily armed Romans. When the
Emperor Caligula ordered the erection of his statue in Jerusalem, he
was met by adamant refusal of the Jews to allow it. Although dis-
armed, they met the commander of the Roman troops outside the city
and said in effect that the soldiers could enter the city only over their
bodies. They also instituted an agricultural strike. Before action of
this kind the militarily powerful Romans hesitated, the commander
referred the case back to Rome, and eventually it was decided not to
erect the statue.6
The attitude of early Christians to the Roman Empire was essen-
tially one of non-resistance which had the effect, in many respects, of
what we can call non-violent resistance. Ostensibly rejecting active
opposition to the state, Christians nevertheless believed that there
3 Exodus 1-15. Sanctions seem to be left to "The Lord."
4 1 Molmvsmr, HiSTORY OF Romsn 346-50 (Dickson transl. 1894).
5 Id. at 349.
6 JosEPHUs, AzTQuTrrms oF TnE JEws Bk. XVIII, Ch. 8. (Whiston transl. 1737).
Non-violent resistance, of course, was only one factor in a complicated situation.
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were some acts which they simply could not in good conscience per-
form. What is more, a deep chasm developed between the outlook of
many Christians and the general culture of the Empire. When the
Christian was asked to sacrifice to the "genius" of the Emperor, he
refused. While this was an individual act and not directly "political" or
concerted, the effect of thousands of believers taking this position was
not unlike that of the non-violent resister in every age: the rulers' self-
confidence was undermined and they were beset by inner doubts.
Although they frequently reacted with brutal violence, as in the perse-
cutions of Decius and Diocletian,7 this very violence reflected a certain
uneasiness about their own position. As for the Christians' clashes with
the general culture, they were no less effective because they did not
constitute formal civil disobedience. When Christians refused to eat
meat which had been sacrificed to idols,8 declined to attend the games,
or stubbornly rejected all public offices, they may have been violating
no explicit law; but they were, nevertheless, by these boycotts, effec-
tively undermining many of the values which traditional Roman cul-
ture held dear. And the larger the number of devotees, the more
certainly was this true.
One is impressed by the insistence of the early Church Fathers that
Christians must reject many practices which their contemporaries ac-
cepted. From admonitions about women's dress to rejection of military
service, the Fathers in effect advised a program of partial non-co-
operation.9 By the middle of the second century, this program had
begun to have an enormous effect, even though Christians were then
only a small minority. Their rejection of pagan cults had adversely
affected the artisanship and trade connected with religious objects.
Pagans like Celsus, writing against the Christians, alleged that military
service was being seriously undermined by the repugnance of Chris-
tians for war and the oath.10
Middle Ages
Although the Middle Ages were no doubt a violent epoch,
examples of what might be legitimately termed non-violent direct
7 GBoN, DEcLm AND FALL OF = Romx Eiwxnm Ch. XVI (1776-1788), de-
velops the theme of persecution in general. See also MASON, PERSECUTION OF Dioc-E-
Tisw (1876).
81 Corinthians 8.
9See generally CADoux, Tnn EARLY Cmmcu AND THE WORLU (1925).
10For Celsus" arguments against Christians in general, see OruGEN, CONTRA CEL-
stm (Crombie transl.) in 23 ANTE-NICENE Cmus r Lmn.aAY (Roberts & Donaldson
ed. 1872).
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action were not lacking. The medieval estates, for example, by with-
holding financial assistance to the King, could often help shape
policies of the Crown; and while there always lurked the possibility
of violent action by the nobility as part of this resistance, the prime
power lay in largely non-violent non-co-operation. The indispensa-
bility of the economic resources of the town also played its role in
developing traditions of municipal autonomy--when the burghers
were willing to stand together and recognize the vital place of their
co-operation in the life of the monarchy.
In Modern Times
But the efficacy of non-violent direct action seemed always to be
obscured by the more dramatic and seemingly radical reliance on
violence. During the sixteenth century, characterized by most religious
groups' resort to violence, the advice of men like Etienne de la Bo6tie
was largely ignored. At a time when Catholics were destroying Calvin-
ists and Calvinists murdering Catholics and during a period when po-
litical assassinations were prominent, de la Bo6tie was writing his trea-
tise on voluntary servitude and attempting to state in simple terms the
case for non-violent direct action.11 Going directly to the heart of the
problem, he contended that in the end tyranny of all kinds flourishes
because men choose "voluntarily" to be slaves. The structure of tyran-
ny reposes basically upon the readiness of a few men to obey the sover-
eign, largely for immedialte personal gain, the equally great willingness
of other human beings to submit to these secondary "slaves," and other
subservient persons down through a hierarchy of submission. Catholics
were oppressed by Protestant princes, argued the Catholic de la Bo6tie,
because they lacked the courage or the will to withhold in concerted
fashion the obedience so essential for any political rule. It is unneces-
sary, he went on, to use violence against the tyrant or his immediate
minions: clear-cut withdrawal of support by those in the lower
echelons would cause the whole structure to collapse without the
firing of a single shot. De la Boetie was appalled by the fact that whole
nations throughout history had accepted voluntary servitude so readily.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, theories of non-
violent direct action, including civil disobedience, came to the fore
with the development of the anarchist tradition and the beginning of
11DE LA Bo iE, DiscouRs DE LA SERvrrUDE VOLONTAIBE (1576) (Kurz transl.
as A_m-DICTAToR (1942)).
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modem pacifism. William Godwin was a good representative of the
former and, in great measure, of the latter as well.' Analyzing the po-
litical problem in ways reminiscent of de la Boetie, Godwin suggested
that both war and tyranny could be undermined by the development
of an enlightened opinion which might be reflected in non-violent
non-co-operation of individuals. And the poet Shelley made the spirit
of Godwin explicit in verses advocating non-violent, non retaliatory
resistance.' Carrying on this tradition to some extent, Leo Tolstoy
during the concluding years of the nineteenth century suggested that
individual non-violent direct action, if implemented on a large scale,
could accomplish what violence could never do.14
Meanwhile, in the realm of practical politics, men without either
the means of violence or truly representative government turned to
various forms of non-violent direct action. In Ireland, much of the
agitation against British rule took the form of non-payment of rents.' 5
In Hungary, after the violent methods of men like Louis Kossuth had
proved ineffective against the claim of the Austrians to rule the Mag-
yars, the latter turned to various expressions of non-violent resistance
under the leadership of Francis De k.16 Their actions were vital in
securing the eventual establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867.
In the twentieth century the story of Gandhi is well-known. First
in South Africa and later in India, he perfected the technique and
theory of Satyagraha,17 which played a significant role in securing
amelioration of the lot of the Indian in South Africa and in eventually
bringing about the independence of India.' 8 In modem times non-
violent direct action has also been important in broadening the suf-
frage in Belgium,19 obtaining the independence of Ghana,20 and de-
veloping the political consciousness of non-white inhabitants of South
Africa.2'
12 CODwIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCE-NING POLITICAL JUSTICE (1793).
1s E.g., Shelley The Mask of Anarchy (1819) in THE CoYLEPTE POETICAL WORKS
oF PEncv BYssHm SHELS 338 (Hutchinson ed. 1934).
14 Tolstoy was not, however, an advocate of highly organized non-violent resistance.
For a critical analysis of Tolstoy's attitude, see MAUDE, LIF OF TOLSTOY: LATER YEARS
353-67 (1910).
15 TuC=ER, INDIvIDUAL LmERTY (1926).
16 GrnrrH, THE RESURcRECON OF HuNGcAY: A PARALaz FOR IRELAND (1918).
1 7 DxwAxR, SATYAGRAHIA: THE PowER OF TRUTH (1948).
18 BoNpvuA--r, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE (1958); GANDHif, SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH
AFRICA (1954 ed.); SHRIDHIARANI, op. cit. supra note 2.
19 Cnoox, Co m Iu-Sm AND =H GENERAL STuxz 210-19 (1960).
201d. at 354-6.
21K umi PAssrvE RESISTANCE IN SoUTH AFRICA (1957).
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The American Tradition and the Negro Struggle
As part of the tradition of non-violence, the United States has had
its own complex background and it is out of the American experience
that Negro activities of the past two decades have sprung.
The Early Period
Early American non-violence developed out of the Anabaptist and
Quaker religious heritages. The Mennonites, who settled largely in
Pennsylvania, took a "non-resistant" position. While they generally
emphasized passive obedience, under certain circumstances they
refused to conform to prevalent custom or obey law; thus they refused
to serve in the army, even when legally required, and they declined
public office on what they deemed to be Scriptural grounds.2 2 The
Quakers insisted that if exact justice were done, violence and oppres-
sive rule would not appear on a large scale; and William Penn, as
founder of Pennsylvania, endeavored to implement this idea. Pennsyl-
vania under Quaker control was without an army, yet Indian wars
were unknown for about two generations.23 The habit of resistance to
oppressive rule became firmly rooted: thus on one occasion the judges
resigned in large numbers rather than administer oaths; and at another
time, Quaker shipowners engaged in non-violent resistance against
what they regarded as illegal ship dues.2 4
During the days immediately preceding the American Revolution,
many actions of the colonists took the form of largely non-violent
resistance, including boycotts.2 5 It is arguable that had resistance re-
mained of this nature, the social and moral costs of independence
would have been vastly less than they actually were as a result of the
violence of the Revolution.
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Throughout the nineteenth century, justifications for and the
practice of non-violent resistance were not lacking. Henry D. Thoreau
penned his notable essay on the moral and political obligation of the
individual to resist the state on occasion,26 although he did not advo-
cate what is now called mass civil disobedience. Organized opposition
2 2 On Mennonite doctrine, see generally HEmsHBERCE, WAR, PEACE AND No-
mSISTANCE (1944).2 8 SHAAnPsS, A QuA=R ExPmuEmrr iN GovmnuwmNr (1898).
2 4 JANNE y, THE LIER oF WLm PENN 492-93 (1852).
2 5 Scm siNGER, THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS AND THE AMEIuCAN E;vOL noN
(1918).
2 6 TnOa,,Au, ON E DuTy OF CrVm DISommNcE (1849).
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to the fugitive slave laws often took the form of deliberate disobedi-
ence by men who appealed to the "higher law" so exalted by statesmen
like Seward. When Walt Whitman advised the States to resist much,
obey little,27 he was undoubtedly not speaking merely for himself.
Non-violent direct action has played an important role in several
areas of life since the Civil War, as Eric Goldman has recently empha-
sized.28 Thus the struggle for women's suffrage sometimes took the
form even of civil disobedience. The labor strike, too, whether em-
ployed for economic or political ends, can be an excellent example of
resistance without violence, and the ablest labor leaders have fully
recognized that that strike which is least violent is the most likely to be
successful. 20
Non-Violence and the American Negro
Historically, American Negroes have exemplified almost every
possible attitude to their low status, from virtually complete passivity
to advocacy of violence. During slavery their hopes for emancipation
were often transferred to another life, although slave revolts were not
unknown. After emancipation, their status was in some respects even
more degrading than under chattel slavery and their patience the more
remarkable, for their "freedom" was a kind of mockery. Nevertheless,
their economic status improved somewhat after the opening years of
the twentieth century and those who followed men like Booker
Washington held that economic advancement must somehow precede
claims for full civil and political rights.3 0
With the foundation of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People in 1909,81 a concerted effort for implementa-
tion of civil rights began to be made in legislative bodies and courts,
particularly after World War J.82 These endeavors culminated in
Brown v. Board of Educ. in 1954,83 and this decision has spurred not
2 7 Whmr.N, To The States (1860), in LEA Es OF GRASs 7 (Modem Library
1921).
28 Goldman, Progress-By Moderation and Agitation, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1961
(Magazine), p. 5.
29Tom Mooney Molders' Defence Committee, Press Service, Aug. 26, 1936.
Mooney's remark was, "[V]iolence is the weapon used by the employers .... Violence
wins no strike ... only education and organization [wins]:'
80B. WASHNGTOx, Up FROM SiAvEaY (1901). See also LomAx, THE NEGRO
REvOLT 32-38 ('1962).3 1 HUGHES, FrcmE Fort FREEsoM: THE STORY OF THE NAACP (1962).
82 MyP Lj, AN AmmuCAN Dnm. ans 819-36 (1962 ed.).
83 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The significance of Brown in encouragement of the strug-
gle for civil rights will probably be seen by historians as of greater import than is
recognized today.
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only greater legislative and judicial efforts but also greater resort to
direct action.
Although examples of direct action in the cause of Negro equality
were not lacking in the nineteenth century-particularly with respect
to travel segregation 84 -not until World War II was organized effort
developed. The great demand for economic opportunity in the defense
industries stimulated interest in non-violent resistance, as did valiant
endeavors of a few dedicated pacifists such as George Houser and
Bayard Rustin. In 1943 the Congress of Racial Equality was founded, 5
after picketing and sit-ins by the Chicago Committee of Racial Equal-
ity had demonstrated possibilities of success. The Congress-or CORE,
as it came to be called-was specifically Gandhian in outlook and its
first director, Houser, had gone to prison as a conscientious objector
during the war. The pioneer direct action efforts of CORE after 1949 in
St. Louis, Baltimore, Los Angeles, and New York laid the groundwork
for the better-known non-violent resistance of the sixties.
In 1955-1956 occurred the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott,
which did much to stimulate interest in direct action, and to encourage
-those who believed in peaceful protest. As a direct outgrowth of the
Montgomery affair, some 100 Southern civil rights leaders met in
Atlanta on January 10, 1957, to consider plans for co-ordinating the
many campaigns of non-violent resistance which had sprung up as a
result of the bus boycott. 6 Two months later, as the fruit of the Atlanta
meeting, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference was born in
New Orleans.8 Although the best-known work of the conference has
been its sponsorship of direct action, it also played an important role
in general civic education. Indeed, its leaders insisted that education
and direct action went hand in hand.
The year 1960 heralded the beginning of widespread direct action
throughout the South and border States. Much of the work of
organizing was taken over by college students, who increasingly re-
flected an impatience with "talk" and a corresponding demand for
action. Although original student direct action was largely spontane-
ous, the need for co-ordination and planning led to the organization of
the Student Nonviolent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC). Centers
34 See generally WEsTiN, Ride-ins and Sit-ins of the 1870's in FBnom Now 68-74
(1964).
35 Direct Action in the South, New South, Oct.-Nov. 1963, p. 1. See generally
GAEFMNXL, W -N NEGRoES MARnG (1959).
86 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, War Resisters League Peace Calen-
dar, in WE: SHAmL Ovrmcomm 6 (1964).
37 Ibid.
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of committee activity were located in Greenwood, Mississippi, Albany,
Georgia, and Selma, Alabama. Workers for the committee often made
heroic efforts to register voters and combat segregation, coming to
know at first hand the social and economic problems of the desperately
poor Southern Negroes.
As campaigns of non-violent direct action spread, organizations
and groups hitherto unsympathetic became active and thus reinforced
those who had taken the initial steps. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, although it had played an important
part in the civil rights movement, had for the most part shied away
from direct action. By 1964, however, even it had begun to sponsor
some projects.
Meanwhile, civil rights leaders had to grapple with certain prob-
lems which the growth of direct action had created. The influx of
relatively large numbers unfamiliar with non-violence made acute the
need for more adequate training methods. Some who were new to
the movement seemed to see non-violence as a mere expedient to be
supplemented on occasion by violence. A few appeared at times to
believe that direct action eliminated the need for other forms of ac-
tivity. Still others sought to use direct action in doubtful contexts,
as when some thought that "stall-in" tactics during the New York
World's Fair of 1964 could force action by legislative and administra-
tive bodies. Finally, organizational and personality tensions sometimes
caused efforts to falter.8
Despite these difficulties, by 1965 there was little evidence that
direct actionists had lost confidence in the movement. To be sure,
part of the leadership asked for suspension of demonstrations during
the election campaign of 1964, but they did this only with the under-
standing that resistance would be renewed after the presidential
contest. Some Negro voices were beginning to doubt that violence
either could or ought to be avoided, but those most active in non-
violent resistance seemed not to share these doubts and, indeed, as
with Martin Luther King, appeared to be reinforced in their con-
victions by their experiences.
To evaluate the place of Negro direct action in the history of
Western and American non-violence, we can observe that from the
viewpoint of sheer numbers involved it is almost without parallel-
only the Indian movement exceeds it in this respect. It has reflected;
too, a remarkable capacity for organization, self-sacrifice, strategy,
3 8 See generally LomAx, THE NE:GRO REVOLT 47-63 (1962); W.sTw, op. cit. supra
note 34.
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and tactics. In the future it will probably serve as model for similar
efforts elsewhere. But any judgment of its future must depend on
a more detailed examination of its theory and practice. To these we
now turn.
Theory of Direct Action and the Negro Struggle
The general theory of non-violent direct action has been elaborated
in a number of volumes. 9 Although exact formulations of the idea will
vary considerably from one writer to another, we can discern certain
common threads.
Basic Principles
Underlying the theory is the observation that consent, either ac-
tive or passive, is central to any power structure or scheme of super-
and sub-ordination. Rulership is conditioned in great measure by the
degree of acquiescence of those governed. Society, from this perspec-
tive, is a kind of confederation in which groups support or reject one
another horizontally, and in which each group vertically, in greater
or lesser degree, either accepts or rejects those who purport to rule.
Any acts which seriously undermine a pattern of acquiescence or
consent can potentially effect fundamental changes.
In most societies there is a psychological tendency, which varies
with circumstances, for men to seek subordination to avoid the re-
sponsibility which goes with freedom.40 Power structures (the term
is used frequently in the literature of Negro direct action) depend
in considerable measure on this phenomenon. Then, too, they rely in
greater or lesser degree on the fact that complex division of labor
inevitably separates men from one another in terms of immediate
interests: thus the police, who may come from the masses, can for
social or economic gain be used to intimidate the latter. Patterns of
acquiescence, moreover, which have existed for generations tend by
virtue of that very fact to be continued without question, even with-
out overt threat of sanctions. Once a syndrome of super- and sub-
ordination has been initiated, the overwhelming tendency is for it to
persist. On the basis of experience, as John Stuart Mill pointed out,41
39 E.g., BoNDUvANr, op. cit. supra note 18; CASE, NoN-vioLENTr CoEacioN (1923);
DE LICT, THE CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE: AN ESSAY ON WAR ANsD REVOLUTION (Tracy
transl. 1938); GREG, Tm PowER oF NoNVwoLENCE (rev. ed. 1959); SRm UL&NAx 4 op.
cit. supra note 2; THE QUIET BATTLE (Sibley ed. 1963).
40 Compare FROMM, ESCAPE FRoM FREEDOm (1941) which is based on German
experience.
41 MILL, ON LmERTY (1859).
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we can expect most men, even if they are badly exploited, to obey
rather than rebel.
It is this acquiescence which exponents of non-violent direct action
challenge in the sharpest way, for they deny that custom necessarily
embodies moral authority. They may even challenge the claims of
statutory law itself. Deliberately withdrawing their consent at crucial
points, they confront the sustainer of current custom or law with a
dilemma: -he must either attempt to intimidate them by threatening
greater use of physical force, which may imply the destruction of
the order that gives him his authority and power; or, on the other
hand, he must attempt to work out a settlement whereby the old
pattern might be altered. To the ruler or defender of the status quo,
neither alternative is pleasant, for both tend to lead to situations in
which his old position is undermined.
In such a situation, the dissident group or individual not only
withdraws consent but also appeals to a value system which the de-
fender of the established system may have in common with the rebel.
It is notorious that no culture ever implements its professed values
-completely: always there is a gap between the norm exalted and the
performance. In calling attention to the violation of the standard
which both profess to accept, the rebel of non-violent direct action
hopes to appeal to the ruler's moral sense, and to work on his con-
science. The primary initial purpose of any non-violent direct action
is, therefore, to produce a "change of heart" of the opponent, to arouse
him spiritually, to appeal to that within him which, while submerged
below the level of consciousness, is seeking a greater congruence be-
tween his professed ideal and his actions. Human beings strain for
consistency, and while there is always a strong tendency to achieve
it by rationalizing actions which do not conform to announced values,
the attempt to attain it by changing conduct is certainly of at least
equal significance.
One is impressed on reading Gunnar Myrdars classic study of
the Negro minority problem with the relevance of these considera-
tions. Long before the intensive direct action of the sixties, Myrdal
was pointing out that the "American Dream" of equality acted as a
critic of all the actions in American culture which betrayed it.4
42 MYDAL, op. cit. supra note 32. See Introduction at lxix-lxxxbii. Noting the con-
flict between diverse ideals and the tension between particular ideals and practice,
Myrdal observes at lxxii: "We shall find that even a poor and uneducated white person
in some isolated and backward rural region in the Deep South, who is violently preju-
diced against the Negro and intent upon depriving him of civil rights and human in-
dependence, has also a whole compartment in his valuation sphere housing the entire
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Throughout the history of Negro-white relations, a large segment of
the exploiting "race" has been uneasy about its performance. Pre-
cisely because its guilt is pushed beneath the level of consciousness,
its actions against the Negro often betray it. Its very vehemence in
asserting superiority is in some measure an indication that it knows
it is lying. Its fears reflects its uncertainties, just as its doubts feed on
its fears: in pre-Civil War days, its obsession was the danger of slave
revolts, and the more it sought to prevent them by repressive legisla-
tion the greater these fears became. In more recent years its acts of
rank discrimination reflect not merely ignorance but also guilt-the
guilt is fed by the discrimination and the discrimination by the guilt.
Direct action seeks to bring to the surface these inner doubts and
implicit feelings of guilt, and to confront the exploiter with his own
better self which he has so long suppressed. By a kind of shock treat-
ment, it hopes to make him aware of his other self seeking to pass
judgment on the self which supports discrimination. Direct action in
the civil rights struggle expects that this newly revealed hidden self
will win the victory. Just as Gandhi in his struggle against British im-
perialism hoped to bring out the anti-imperialist in the imperial ad-,
ministrator, so exponents of non-violence in America seek to expose
the egalitarian that lurks, however deeply, in those who sustain
segregation and racial discrimination.
More than this, however, is involved. In any social struggle an
appeal must be made to public opinion. To be sure, it is often difficult
to identify what we mean by opinion, and in some situations this
force may seem to be absent-everyone appears to be directly in-
volved in the struggle itself. Nevertheless, in most situations of non-
violent direct action conflict, some segments of the community are
not as intimately enmeshed as the immediate participants: the actions
of the latter, therefore, become crucial. In the Gandhi struggle for
independence the strategy and tactics of the Satyagrahis were in-
tended to affect British home opinion and, indeed, world opinion. In
the American Negro conflict the appeal is not merely to those regarded
as immediate discriminators or segregators but also-and perhaps
primarily-to the general public, which, it is hoped, will eventually
side with the resisters.
But what specific acts of non-violent resisters, affect the attitudes
either of those immediately involved or of the general public? First, the
American Creed of liberty, equality, justice and fair opportunity for everybody....
And these more general valuations-more general in the sense that they refer to all
human beings-are, to some extent, effective in shaping his behavior."
[Vol. is
general appeal to values widely held bears in itself a kind of in-
fluence. Much depends, of course, on how the appeal is made; and
here blunders can be committed as in any struggle. Nevertheless, the
proposition remains: an effective statement of the discrepanc.y be-
tween principle and practice, ideals and their betrayal, carries its
own power.
Secondly, the fact that direct actionists take a public position and
stand willing to suffer for it can constitute an enormous reinforcement
of the verbal appeal to values. The theory of non-violent direct action
holds that suffering endured without any attempt to retaliate in kind
is both right in principle and expedient in terms of the effort to change
the attitudes of the opponent and the outlook of public opinion. Al-
though sometimes confused with the idea that suffering is to be sought
in a masochistic way, the direct action notion is quite contrary to this
distortion. The direct actionist on occasion speaks of "absorbing" evil
or suffering. In so doing, he takes the discriminator by surprise,
shocks him into an awareness of reality, and possibly opens up chan-
nels of communication which might not otherwise exist; for the dis-
criminator expects retaliation and when he does not meet it, he may
wonder, think, and come to see his own actions as futile, since they
do not meet the kind of opposition he anticipates. Public opinion,
too, may come to the assistance of the rebel, for there is something
about non-retaliatory suffering, according to direct action theory, that
appeals to the best and the most sympathetic in human nature. What
is more, the resister himself can be strengthened in his own objectives
and motivations: he does not carry the weight of guilt involved in
retaliation, and the very demonstration that he can undergo suffering
will often strengthen his morale for future conflict. He may even be
transformed in outlook and character. The aggressions which he has
hitherto directed blindly and unconstructively against others are now
transmuted into constructive and non-violent power; hence the civil
rights struggle has often witnessed a drdstic decline in petty violence
within the Negro community, as resisters have forgotten their frustra-
tions and been absorbed in the larger conflict. Men who before may
have been regarded as violent types are transformed into self-con-
trolled and disciplined persons.4"
But while the hope of the non-violent direct actionist is that the
opponent will be persuaded to change his position and that public
43 1 have been told by those involved in the civil rights struggle that violence of
Negroes against both whites and other Negroes declines as they become involved in
civil rights direct action.
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opinion will assist, most realistic interpreters of non-violent resistance
as a tactic will admit that ultimate recourse is to a form of coercion.
If the efforts of those participating in demonstrations and negotiations
are not successful, more extreme endeavors are held in readiness-
measures, including mass civil disobedience, which tend to deprive
the opponent of the ability to sustain his position. Some have sug-
gested that the coercive phase of non-violent direct action, by depriv-
ing the opponent of the external panoplies and sanctions of his posi-
tion, places him in a situation where he will be forced to recognize
the objective existence of a world that he has hitherto not seen. But
however it may be stated, he is in effect being coerced, albeit non-
violently.44
Steps in Direct Action
Although theorists of non-violent direct action may differ in the
details and in the precise language they use, there is widespread
agreement that "non-violence" embraces a series of steps from rather
orthodox approaches, on the one hand, to possible mass civil dis-
obedience, on the other.45 The beginning of a campaign must involve
definition of the conflict to be resolved and an awareness that gross
injustice exists. At first, a serious effort is made to correct the injustice
through such methods as appeals to legislative bodies or petitions to
employers or merchants. If these are ineffective, direct actionists feel
justified in resorting to more unorthodox means, always hoping, of
course, that channels of normal communication and negotiation will be
re-opened. Thus street demonstrations may be held and, a still more
drastic step, boycotts may be encouraged. Meanwhile, those who feel
strong enough to play an active role are trained systematically in the
disciplines of non-violent resistance, the emphasis constantly being on
firmness combined with non-retaliation. Some doctrines stress a stage
of "self-purification," in which potential resisters examine their moti-
vations and seek to purge themselves of selfishness. More extreme
phases of resistance may include fasting and individual civil disobedi-
ence by certain leaders. Only under stress of great emergency and
crisis will large-scale avowed civil disobedience be employed.
44 The title of Case's volume, NoN-VIoLENT ConncioN (1923), is an open avowal
of the coercive element in non-violent direct action. Many advocates of this type of
action, notably Gandhi, shy away from use of the word coercion, apparently because
it offends their religious sensibilities. But it would be difficult to find a more descriptive
term for at least this phase of non-violent direct action.45 This is particularly emphasized by Gandhi. See StmoumP, WAR WrraourT
VIOLENCE 3-42 (1939).
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The civil rights struggle has illustrated all levels or stages of direct
action, from initial public protests and negotiations through picketing
and boycotts to civil disobedience. It has also exemplified a broad
awareness of the necessity for explicit education and training in the
meaning and practice of non-violence. Thus there have been schools
for sit-in resisters. The volunteers for the 1964 Mississippi Summer
Project (to encourage voter registration) were carefully prepared for
the kind of violent resistance which they would probably encounter. 8
In developing the disciplines of resistance, appeals to the religious
consciousness and background of Southern Negroes have played an
important role; and it is significant that churches 'have frequently con-
stituted the focal points and Negro pastors the leadership for the
whole movement.47 Where religious consciousness and the church
were less central in the Negro community, as in much of the North,
the basis for disciplined non-violence seemed to be less stable.
But non-violent direct action can be fully understood only when
we see it not merely in principle but also in practice. Although here
we identify several different forms of non-violent direct action, we
should remember that in any given situation virtually all of them may
be and have been employed. Distinctions between forms are some-
what arbitrary and terminology used will often vary.
Picketing and Walks
In picketing, the non-violent direct actionist hopes to dramatize
a situation, alter practices, and arouse opinion. Thus when college
students all over the United States picketed Woolworth's and Kress'
"dime" stores because their Southern affiliates refused to serve or hire
members of minority races, they hoped either directly to change the
policy of merchants or to develop a pressure of opinion which would
do so.48 Various groups, sometimes known as Students for Integration,
participated in the picketing, which was also stimulated by such well-
known organizations as the Congress of Racial Equality.
Two excellent examples of what we are calling the walk or march
immediately come to mind. The first occurred in 1941 and the second
in 1963.
4 6 Selection of volunteers was difficult, for planners of the project were aware of
the beatings and other mistreatment to which the college students would be subjected.
See various issues of The Student Voice, published by the Student Nonviolent Co-
ordinating Committee, Atlanta.
47 Pastoral leadership was due in part to the fact that Negro ministers included some
of the more highly educated men.
48 Often stores picketed did not engage in discrimination, but they belonged to
chains which did.
February, 1965]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Although the first actually never materialized, its very proposal
appeared to affect policy. It must be seen in the context of events im-
mediately preceding American entry into World War II. Negroes were
beginning to awaken and to become aware of their low status in
American society. They were particularly concerned about employ-
ment opportunities in the defense industries; and although Robert
Weaver had been appointed Assistant to the Secretary of Labor in
1940 ostensibly to facilitate this objective, he was without adequate
authority and staff. To be sure, some public agencies did proclaim
non-discrimination policies, but without too much effect. Thus as
late as 1940 the aircraft industry was virtually out-of-bounds to
Negroes, and a vast majority of all labor unions maintained a color bar.
The issue for Negro leaders was how to break down these barriers.
In the autumn of 1940, Negro and white leaders conferred in Hamp-
ton, Virginia, on "Participation of the Negro in National Defense'
and this aroused considerable interest in the non-Negro press.49 But
pressures on the government for an effective policy against discrimina-
tion continued to fall on largely deaf ears. Thus when the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People asked General
William Knudsen of the Office of Production Management to use
pressure on General Motors (in which he had formerly been an execu-
tive), Knudsen refused; and Walter White of the NAACP asserted
that Knudsen declined even to discuss the problem with Negro rep-
resentatives.5"
Meanwhile, Walter White had tried to work on President Roosevelt
himself. But he was constantly frustrated. Thus at a conference in
the White House on September 24, 1940, the President said (accord-
ing to White) that he would not take effective action against dis-
crimination because if he did so "the South would rise up in protest."5'
Although White said that the President betrayed an unjustified lack
of trust in Southern whites, the President remained adamant.
By the end of 1940, to be sure, and early in 1941, some interest
was aroused in Congress. Holders of defense contracts were asked by
the Office of Production Management, on April 19, 1941, not to dis-
criminate. But the OPM action was merely a "request" and had little
effect. As a consequence, Negro delegations now decided that if any-
thing fundamental were to be accomplished, an executive order had
to issued barring all discrimination. But a new question now emerged:
4 9 R1uca/m~s, LAW, JoBs AND POLITCS 13-14 (1953).
50 Id. at 14.
51 ibid.
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How could Roosevelt be persuaded to sign such an order when his
whole record on the discrimination issue had revealed so much reluc-
tance to face it squarely and unequivocally?
It was at this point that A. Philip Randolph, President of the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, suggested a "March on Washing-
ton." His call was taken up and elaborate preparations for the march
began. Scheduled to take place on July 1, some 50,000 persons were
expected to participate.5 No sooner was the march seriously con-
sidered, however, than pressures were placed on Randolph to abandon
it. Thus Mrs. Roosevelt herself, after talking with the President, wrote
Randolph:
I feel very strongly that your group is making a very grave
mistake at the present time to allow this march to take place.... I
feel that if any incident occurs as a result of this, it may engender
so much bitterness that it will create in Congress even more solid
opposition from certain groups than we have had in the past ....
You know that I am deeply concerned about the rights of Negro
people, but I think one must face situations as they are and not as
one wishes them to be.5 s
The letter implied not only that the march would offend Congress,
but also that it might provoke violence. Mrs. Roosevelt's position was
seconded by other representatives of the White House.5 4
To requests like Mrs. Roosevelt's, Randolph and White replied
that preparations had already been made and that to abandon them
before concrete assurances had been given would be to betray the
cause of non-discrimination. On June 18, nevertheless, the March on
Washington Committee did meet with the President, who repeated
his previous requests, and at the same time appointed a committee
to discuss issues with leaders of the march. With virtual unanimity,
the committee felt frustrated by its White House conference and pro-
ceeded to make final arrangements for the mass demonstration.
On June 24, however, the draft of an executive order was sub-
mitted to Negro leaders who, after suggesting broadening modifica-
tions, approved it. On June 25, President Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 8802, which in principle banned discrimination throughout the
government and in defense industries. Only after formal promulgation
of the order did leaders of the march call off the July 1 demonstration,
less than a week before it was scheduled to take place.
52 Id. at 15-17.
5s Amsterdam News, June 21, 1941, p. 3, cited in RucnA3s, op. cit. supra note
49, at 17-18.
54 Ibid.
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While the March of 1941 never went beyond the planning stage,
that of 1963 actually took place and was one of the most dramatic
episodes in the politics of integration. Coming after a long series of
direct action efforts beginning in 1960, it represented the greatest
involvement of the Negro rank and file in American history. President
Kennedy had been slow in implementing many of his 1960 campaign
promises, apparently believing that administrative action and the ap-
pointment of many Negroes to high federal posts would temporarily
stave off demands for legislative measures. However, episodes involv-
ing admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi,5
direct action in Birmingham, and a restlessness among Negroes in the
ghettoes of the North as well as in Southern towns,56 finally moved
him to propose a comprehensive Civil Rights Bill. Negroes and their
white supporters were enthusiastic. But they were also cautious, for
they were quite aware that while the President might propose, Con-
gress disposed; and Congress was controlled by a committee system
which gave disproportionate power to Southern, and therefore hostile,
leadership.
In view of the President's legislative proposals, on the one hand,
and their probable fate at the hands of Congress, on the other, Negro
leadership had to develop the strategies most likely to arouse opinion
in support of the pending bill. Thousands of letters to Congress had
failed in the past under parallel circumstances, as had decorous
speeches and lobbying activities before the national legislative body.
It was under these conditions that the idea of a giant demonstra-
tion began once more to grip the imagination of men like A. Philip
Randolph. The issue was more complex than that which had arisen
in 1940 and 1941, but it also developed within a context of greater
Negro self-consciousness. Although Randolph had originally conceived
of the march as a demonstration centering on Negro employment, con-
ferences with other leaders led to the conclusion that the Civil Rights
Bill should be the center of agitation.
The time seemed to be ripe for action. Much experience with
direct action had now been accumulated and groups like the Congress
of Racial Equality were pushing more conservative organizations in
the direction of unorthodox methods. By the middle of 1963, some
six hundred civil rights demonstrations of various kinds were taking
place in 169 cities located in 32 states.57 Negroes hitherto silent or
5 In autumn of 1962, the Meredith affair entailed serious clashes between state
and national authority, as well as mob violence.
S6 Boomm, BLACK M.N's AsRICA 49-50, 54-56 (1964).
57 1d. at 56.
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indifferent were participating en masse in actions which a few years
before they would have spurned.
With the support of most major Negro organizations, and of many
non-Negro groups as well, the March on Washington was planned
and executed. To those in charge, one of the most serious issues was
how to prevent violence in what would be the largest demonstration
ever to take place in the American capital. This required careful
calculation, the development of a self-policing system, and not a little
understanding on the part of the rank-and-file. When buses and
trains eventually brought about 225,000 Negroes and whites to the
August 28 demonstration, march leaders and government officials
alike were concerned lest violence break out, despite all preparations.
But the fears were groundless.
On the morning of August 28, leaders of the march button-holed
members of Congress and sought in every way possible to emphasize
the urgency of civil rights legislation. There followed the mass dem-
onstration itself, with speeches from both white and Npgro leaders.
Whatever the effect of the march on the subsequent fate of the legisla-
tion passed in the summer of 1964, most observers agree on its signifi-
cance for the Negro community itself. It demonstrated on a large
scale the degree to which large masses of men could discipline them-
selves. It afforded a place in the sun of the civil rights movement for
those who would otherwise have lacked a vehicle to express their
concern. It gave voice to a surging mass of discontent and served to
arouse even greater dissatisfaction with the gulf still existing between
the ideals professed by the culture and the shoddy practices of the
society. As one Negro journalist has put it: "Despite the critics, in-
cluding Negroes who once opposed such a demonstration, the August
28th event became historic, not because of the size of the audience
or the lack of violence, but because it set in the soil of thousands of
marchers' minds the seeds for action against a major problem.""8
Sit-Ins and Their Variations
The sit-ins and their variations were among the most dramatic of
the direct action devices worked out in the course of desegregation
and non-discrimination struggles. They illustrate what the student of
direct action usually emphasizes: the technique to be employed de-
pends upon the immediate objective as well as the general context
of circumstances. In the sit-in, one challenged lunch counter and res-
taurant segregation by sitting where, according to the managers' rules
or custom or law or a combination of the three, one was not supposed
58 Id. at 58.
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to be. Variations were numerous: the wade-in for swimming pools
open to whites only; the kneel-in for churches; the stand-in for li-
braries; and what might be called the walk-in for voter registrations.
During the spring of 1964, some enthusiasts attempted to develop a
stall-in, wereby one obstructed traffic or events at the New York
World's Fair in the name of integration and employment oppor-
tunities.59
The sit-in movement, as contrasted with individual sit-ins which
had occurred at least as early as the forties, began on February 1,
1960, when four Negro college students sat down at a lunch counter
in Greensboro, North Carolina, and demanded service.60 Their act
was spontaneous but it was almost immediately imitated in many
states, which led to organization on a national scale and application
of the principle to parks, transportation, voting, libraries, museums,
beaches, swimming pools, voter registration bureaus, and court-rooms.
It has been estimated that by the autumn of 1961 every border
and Southern state, together with several Mid-western and Western
states, had been affected by sit-in and similar demonstrations;6' 3,600
participants and their allies had been arrested, and approximately
70,000 Negroes and whites had been involved in sit-ins, street demon-
strations, picketing, and mass meetings supporting the sit-inners.62
During the same period-perhaps the classical epoch of what might
be called the sit-in era-not a few students and faculty members
were dismissed because of their connections with the sit-ins; although,
as usual, college administrations on the whole alleged other reasons.
In one institution, Southern University of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 236
students felt so deeply about the expulsion of several student sit-in
fomentors, that they withdrew from college in protest.63
A few details will illustrate the situations in which the sit-inners
found themselves. In Florida, the first sit-in took place on February
59 These efforts were widely condemned by many who ordinarily sympathized with
non-violent direct action, partly on the ground that the "stall-inners" were not truly
motivated by the spirit of non-violence. The Christian Century, May 6, 1964, p. 623,
sarcastically proposed a "Stall-In Code."
60 1963 CoMM'N ON CIvIL EIGHTS REP., CvI IGHTS '63, at 107-08. See also
LomAx, op. cit. supra, note 30, at 121-31. See generally PEcK, CRACKING Tmn COLOR
LINE: NoN-voLENT DmECT ACTION METHODS OF ELIMINATING RACIAL DISCRmMNATION
(1960); Fleming, The Changing South and Sit-Ins, J. OF INTERGRoup RELATIONS
(Winter 1960-1961): Mabee, Evolution of Non-violence: Two Decades of Sit-Ins, Nation,
Aug. 12, 1961.





12, 1960, in Deland, and later was taken up by Florida A and M
students in Tallahassee, nine of whom sat in at the local Woolworth's
store. Within a brief period of time some 243 sit-inners were arrested on
such charges as "disturbing the peace," "unlawful assembly," and
"disorderly conduct."64
In Louisiana, the first sit-in occurred in March, 1960, at Baton
Rouge; the movement later reached the cities of Shreveport and New
Orleans. In addition to the kinds of legal charges brought against
Florida sit-inners, arresting authorities in Louisiana alleged violation
of statutes prohibiting obstructing of "public passage" and invoked
little-used laws against "criminal mischief" and "criminal anarchy."65
In North Carolina, where the sit-in movement had begun, many
cities were affected within a brief period. There were more than 200
arrests, and new charges including "obstructing the sidewalk," "affray,"
and "assault and battery."66 One of the few serious charges of violence
against a Negro occurred in Monroe, where Robert Williams, who
rejected the ethic of non-violence, gathered his followers around him,
and fought a white group.
In the border state of Oklahoma, sit-ins were initiated in 1958, long
before the official beginning of the movement. By the autumn of 1961,
scores of both college and high school students had become involved.67
Texas began its sit-in wave on March 5, 1960, when 100 Negro
students from Texas Southern University protested at a lunch counter
in a supermarket. From there the demonstrations radiated to Austin,
San Antonio, Houston, Amarillo, Galveston, Marshall, Dallas, and
Beaumont. As was true of most sit-ins, such violence as occurred was
by whites against Negroes. Thus in Houston, a Negro was beaten by
a white man; and another was whipped severely with a chain. In
Marshall, the police, holding police dogs on leashes in a threatening
manner, broke up a peaceful Negro meeting by fire hosing it.68
Leaders of the sit-in movement were unusually careful about train-
ing participants, realizing that there might be strong temptations to
use violence. Local groups of sit-inners, also influenced by Gandhian
and Christian teaching, sought to make explicit what non-violence
implied in a sit-in situation. As an example of deliberately developed
codes of conduct, we might cite the rules drawn up for their actions
by Nashville students:
64 Id. at 5.
orId. at 7.
66 Id. at 8-9.
67 Id. at 9-10.
68 Id. at 11-12.
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Don't strike back or curse if abused. Don't laugh out. Dont hold
conversations with floor workers. Don't leave your seats until your
leader has given you instruction to do so. Don't block entrances to
the stores and the aisles. Show yourself courteous and friendly at all
times. Sit straight and always face the counter. Report all serious
incidents to your leader. Refer all information to your leader in a
polite manner. Remember love and non-violence. May God bless
each of you.69
Max Lerner, commenting on non-violent direct action about this
time, remarked: "The American Negroes are almost the last Christians
in America in the sense of taking their religion with serious simplicity.
If anyone should be able to make the method work, they should."70
Boycotts and Selective Buying
Boycotts were used independently of sit-ins and other direct
action, or sometimes in conjunction with them. In some instances,
the term "selective buying" was employed partly in the hope that
it might help participants avoid local laws against boycotts.7 1 The
theory was, apparently, that if Negroes were advised to patronize
certain establishments rather than to spurn others, it would be diffi-
cult to prove a boycott. Among the best-known examples of boycotting
were those which took place in Tuskegee, Nashville, and Birmingham.
But there were literally scores of boycotts, some informal and others
organized.
The Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott72 was a model for other
efforts and will be used to illustrate the difficulties and complexities
that arise in all such campaigns. It began on December 1, 1955, when
Mrs. Rosa Parks, who had taken a seat just behind the "white"
division line on a city bus, was asked to move back in order to permit
a white man to have a seat. She refused to move, maintaining that it
was unjust to compel her to do so, since she had occupied her seat
first. Thereupon she was arrested and later on was tried. It should be
noted that, like the first sit-in, this was a spontaneous act and was
not initially connected with any organized movement.
But her adamant refusal to move struck a spark that eventually
led to desegregation of the buses in Montgomery. Her action soon
became known to the Negro community, a bus boycott was called for
69 N.Y. Times, March 20, 1960, p. 28. See also PRouDFoor, DrL&rY OF A Srr-MN
(1962); Lincoln, The Strategy of a Sit-In, The Reporter, Jan. 5, 1961, p. 20.
70 N.Y. Post, Feb. 22, 1960.
71 See, e.g., Lees, Boycott in Philadelphia, in WEsmm, FREEDom Now 231-36
(1964).72 See generally Kwr, STRtDE TowAno Fiflbom (1958).
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by Negro leaders, and later on the Montgomery Improvement Asso-
ciation helped organize the protest. A car pool was established to
carry Negroes to and from work-this was only one example of the
spirit of solidarity which the boycott evoked.73 Many Negroes spurned
the pool, however, preferring the symbolic value of walking as a
protest against pent-up injustices suffered in the past. The demands
of the boycotters were at first very simple: courteous treatment by
bus drivers, seating on a basis of "first come, first served" within the
limits of the city ordinance providing for segregation, and hiring of
Negro bus drivers on routes serving Negro sections of the city.
During the course of the boycott, however, the leaders soon
reached the conclusion that the original proposals for "justice" within
the segregation pattern were not enough. The basic purpose of segre-
gation was to promote injustice and inequality; hence the achievement
of justice required the elimination of segregation. Thus while the
original requests were "moderate," they were soon transformed into
the more basic or radical desegregation demands.
The leaders very early discovered, too, that they had to overcome
what seemed to be almost impossible obstacles. Although they were
widely supported by the Negro community, whites, with but few
exceptions, gave them little assistance; and white ministers were al-
most wholly silent. Endeavors of all kinds were made to split the
Negro community, ultimately with little success but with much short-
run embarrassment. There were several serious bombings-all directed
against Negro-owned or occupied houses. Negro leaders were sub-
jected to all manner of harassment, such as arrests on trumped-up
charges or for alleged violations of the traffic laws.74
The boycott itself was virtually complete; participation far ex-
ceeded the expectations of those who initiated it. Its effect on business-
men was profound, for they discovered that concerted action by the
Negro population could drastically change economic life. Organized
as the Men of Montgomery, leading merchants and professional men
endeavored to negotiate with the Improvement Association (the boy-
cotters), and Martin Luther King thinks that the negotiations would
have proved successful had it not been for pressures of the City
Commission in the other direction.75 Even so, economic pressure
would probably have succeeded eventually. But further negotiations
73 Id. at 85. Close co-operation among a diversity of Protestant denominations was
another example of solidarity.
74Id. at 128. King was arrested and jailed for "speeding thirty miles an hour in
a twenty-five mile zone.
75Id. at 121-22.
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proved unnecessary, when the Supreme Court, confirming judgment
of the federal district court, ordered desegregation of Montgomery
buses.76 Thus the long and complex boycott ended on November 13,
1956, nearly a year after it had begun.
The Freedom Rides
No assessment of direct action can ignore the "freedom rides."
They served to underline the plight of the minority in a way some-
times more dramatic than sit-ins and boycotts. At the same time, they
were perhaps the most controversial of all the methods, in that they
appeared to provoke the greatest violence by the antagonists.
On March 13, 1961, the Congress of Racial Equality revealed
plans for a biracial group to travel buses across state lines to force
implementation of judicial rulings favorable to desegregation in trans-
port facilities. 77 The President of the United States, in accordance with
the spirit of direct action, was informed of their intent.
When seven Negroes and six whites began their trip, they at first
discovered little opposition. Through Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia they met no violence; in fact, their deliberate
challenge of local segregation customs was often successful in break-
ing down what hitherto had been an almost never challenged pattern
of rigid segregation in waiting-rooms and other facilities. 8
In Alabama, however, the situation was radically different. Just
outside Anniston, a mob cut the tires of the Greyhound bus and
threw a bomb into it. A Trailways bus managed to get into Birming-
ham, only to have its freedom riders brutally beaten by a mob await-
ing them at the station. Although the police had been warned before-
hand to expect a mob, they did not arrive on the scene until ten
minutes after the bus-and too late. So severely injured were the
freedom riders that they took a plane from Birmingham to New
Orleans and thus ended their official mission.
These were followed by many more riders who, far from being
intimidated by the events of Birmingham, seemed only to be spurred
on to greater efforts. Altogether, several hundred eager riders followed
76 Gale v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
77 1961 COM3'N ON CrviL RIGHTs REP., JUsTIcE 29-30; Southern Regional Council
Special Report, The Freedom Ride 1-2 (1961); see Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454(1960).
78 Direct Action in the South, New South, Oct.-Nov. 1963, p. 7. See generally
PECK, FREEDOM RIDE (1961).79 Southern Regional Council Special Report, The Freedom Ride 2 (1961).
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the original thirteen, making the issue of segregated buses and waiting-
room facilities one of the best-publicized of the whole direct action
effort.
Spreading out through the Deep South, the riders were frequently
met by violence and the force used on them was often aided and
abetted by local police departments. Governor Patterson of Alabama
called them "agitators" and said that while his officers would escort
them to the border of the State, they would not accompany them to
other Alabama towns.80 In view of the outbreaks, the Federal Attorney
General ordered 600 federal marshals into the South to prevent fur-
ther eruptions; and at points, National Guardsmen accompanied the
riders on their mission.
A pattern of rides with arrests on arrival was eventually developed.
When the riders would reach a given city, they were arrested, usually
for a breach of the peace, and were frequently sentenced to jail.
Here it is important to emphasize, however, that while they were
detained on charges of violating local laws and ordinances, their whole
purpose was to help implement federal court decisions which had
prohibited compulsory segregation on interstate buses and in terminals
associated with transportation.81 Thus the riders were not engaging in
deliberate acts of civil disobedience but rather were seeking to exer-
cise rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
A fact to be stressed, too, is that the riders themselves carefully
refrained from violence. Because of the controversies stirred up by
them, they were portrayed as "inciting" violence. Their personal ac-
tions, however, were as disciplined as the sit-inners; they refused to
return blow for blow and carefully observed codes developed for
non-violent resistance.8 2
Although their actions were like those of the sit-inners in many
respects, it is also of interest to note wherein they differed. The sit-ins
were almost always of local origin, even if later assisted by national
organizations, while the freedom rides originated outside the South.
This was to be the basis of much Southern criticism; for enemies, by
alleging that the riders were "outside agitators," could appeal to a
long-standing distrust of Yankees and Northerners.
80 1961 Comm' oiq CIVIL RIGHT REP., JusTCE 31; ibid.
slE.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Mitchell v. United States, 313
U.S. 80 (1941).
82 lostow, The Freedom Riders and the Future, Reporter, June 22, 1961, p. 18-21;
American Survey, Economist, June 10, 1961, p. 1109; Direct Action in the South, New
South, Oct.-Nov. 1963, p. 7.
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Civil Disobedience
Although avowed civil disobedience-that is, deliberate disregard
by resisters of what they deemed to be a positive legal obligation-
was relatively rare in the direct action movement, it did occur and
was defended.
One of the clearest cases of civil disobedience in the eyes of
non-violent resisters themselves occurred in connection with the cam-
paign against discrimination in Birmingham, Alabama. Here the
leaders and their followers consciously violated a court order issued
to restrain their activities, and they recognized in their breach an
explicit defiance of a legal command.
In the spring of 1963, a highly organized effort was begun. Its
purpose was to break down discrimination and segregation in the
business section of the city.83 The campaign was a complex of sit-ins,
street demonstrations of various kinds, kneel-ins, and voter registra-
tions. As usual, arrests of sit-inners on several charges began almost
immediately. After three days of direct action against lunch counters,
for example, there had been thirty-five arrests. On April 6, according
to plan, a march on the city hall began. The marchers were carefully
selected and highly disciplined and they walked without printed
slogans or banners and did not even sing. All seemed to be going well
when, three blocks from their goal, the participants were confronted
by the police who barred their way. The marchers halted. They were
ordered by the officers to disperse. This they refused to do, where-
upon more than forty were arrested for "parading without a permit."
They were led off to jail singing songs of freedom, as Negro spectators
cheered loudly. On the days following, demonstrations continued.
The participants seemed to be encouraged by the jailing of their
predecessors.
Meanwhile, the Birmingham authorities acted. They went into
court on April 10 and obtained an injunction commanding the direct
actionists to cease their activities until, it could be proved that they
had a legal right to demonstrate. Two days after the April 10 injunction,
the leaders of the movement, after careful consideration, instructed
their followers to violate it. Martin Luther King makes much of this
act of deliberate defiance and tells us why he and his colleagues
decided that they had to act as they did. In the South, he argues, the
power structure has frequently used the injunction as a device to
halt perfectly legal actions, including peaceful picketing. Even though
83See generally KING, Way WE CAN'T W.w 47-96 (Signet 1964).
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the actions may eventually be found to have been legal, the injunctive
technique will prolong cases for perhaps two or three years. Mean-
while, the original occasion for the actions will have changed. King
implies that the courts more or less purposely "sit on" cases of this
kind, thus acting, in effect, as political agents of the status quo. In this
way, he maintains, they crippled the car pool during the Montgomery
bus boycott, and they destroyed the protest movement in Talladega,
Alabama, and Albany, Georgia. The injunctive method, he points
out, had excluded the NAACP from activity in Alabama."-
In view of this background the Birmingham direct actionists de-
cided that the court injunction must be explicitly ignored in wide-
spread fashion: "We decided, therefore, knowing well what the con-
sequences would be and prepared to accept them, that we had no
choice but to violate such an injunction."85
It is important to note that the announcement of the intention to
disobey the court order was made to the press. There was no endeavor
to surprise the public or officials; every effort -was made to inform
them. King made it clear that the movement was not "anarchist" and
was not advocating 'lawlessness." But since the courts of Alabama
were notoriously abusing the judicial process to "perpetuate injustice,"
the campaigners could not live with their consciences if they obeyed
the injunction.
The immediate consequences of civil disobedience were what
might be expected. Already several hundred people had gone to jail
as a result of previous demonstrations. Although financial problems
had beset the movement, King and the Reverend Ralph Abernathy
decided that they must be among the first to enter prison after the
decision to defy the courts. With fifty others, they started on the
route of march for the downtown section of Birmingham, to the
plaudits of Negroes who lined the streets. King, Abernathy, and their
followers were arrested and jailed. King was held in solitary confine-
ment for more than twenty-four hours, and refused permission to see
his attorney. Only later was he allowed to consult his legal adviser.
According to his own interpretation, King and his associates did
not commit civil disobedience in Birmingham until they openly re-
jected the injunction and deliberately acted against its commands.
The arrests prior to the injunction had been for parading without a
permit, under an ordinance which King regarded as a clear violation
841d. at 70-71.
85 Id. at 71.
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of the fourteenth amendment. The injunction, however, could not
be dismissed in this way.
Legitimacy and Efficacy
Having outlined the theory of direct action and briefly examined
illustrations of it in the civil rights struggle, we now turn to the ques-
tions of legitimacy and efficacy. Legitimacy as used here will refer to
both legal and ethical permissibility.
Legitimacy: Legal
Most direct action in connection with the integration struggle has
not, in the eyes of its advocates, breached the law. Athough thousands
of arrests were made, most of them occurred, according to this con-
tention, under laws and ordinances which were either unconstitutional
or misapplied. An examination of what might be called the law of
direct action would seem to sustainthis general interpretation.
Certainly the rights of free expression, assembly, and petition give
legal sanction to most demonstrations. As the Supreme Court put it
long ago, the very idea of republican government signifies a right
of citizens to come together for consultations on public affairs.Y6 In
general, too, the Court has sustained the right of peaceful picketing
in industrial disputes, 1 which should surely be enough to support it
in the kinds of picketing characteristic of direct action during the
integration struggle. The key throughout is "peaceable" assembly,
"peaceable" petition, "peaceable" demonstration, "peaceable" picket-
ing.
But while the general principle is clear, the difficulty of distin-
guishing between a "peaceable" assembly and a gathering likely to
become non-peaceable is a notorious one. Some interpretations would
seem to limit rather severely the legal right of public authorities to
restrict public assemblies in the name of preserving order. Thus the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Jersey City ordinance
which gave the director of public safety authority to deny a permit
if, in his judgment, a public meeting might result in disorder and
violence. The local regulation, said the Court, might become a means
for arbitrary suppression of peaceable assembly. Moreover, the con-
tention that suppression might be necessary for the preservation of
order could not be sustained: it was the duty of the police to preserve
8 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
slThomhfil v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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order at assemblies where men were exercising constitutional rights.88
On the other hand, in 1963 the Attorney General of Maryland
maintained that within certain contexts, such as those which prevailed
in the State during the integragtion struggle of that year, no public
assembly could really be "peaceable." Any demonstration, however
overtly peaceful, could be treated as an "overt act constituting riot,"
apparently because its consequences under the circumstances would
be commission of violent acts.89 But the attorney general's view has
found little acceptance in the higher courts.
Because state-enforced segregation is clearly a violation of the
fourteenth amendment, convictions of direct actionists under statutes
purporting to require segregation cannot be supported.90 Hence, as
we have observed, most convictions have been sought under cover of
breach of the peace, trespass, or similar ordinances. To direct action-
ists, such charges have iusually been regarded as unconstitutional
subterfuges or gross misapplications of the law.
By and large, the higher courts have agreed with them in their
criticisms of local officials. Thus the Supreme Court has ruled that
Negroes may not be prosecuted for seeking to use municipally owned
or operated facilities." The mere "possibility of disorder by others
cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if they otherwise have
a constitutional right ... to be present."92 Freedom of speech and as-
sembly, moreover, cannot be abridged "unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."9 8
The right of demonstrators to engage in sit-ins without being sub-
jected to arrest for charges such as breach of the peace has been a
problem of great concern. In 1961 the Supreme Court held that Loui-
siana sit-inners were denied due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment when prosecuted for breach of the peace, since there was
no evidence to show that they had either been boisterous or had by
passive conduct tended to cause a public disturbance.9 4 In several
cases coming from a number of Southern cities, the Court ruled in
1963 that sit-inners could not be convicted on a charge of trespass,
88 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
89 Editorial Research Reports, Aug. 14, 1963, p. 597.
90Gayle V. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
91 Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
92 Id. at 293.
93 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
94 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
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since state action enforcing segregation, either directly or indirectly,
was involved 5
Finally, street demonstrations constituted the issue in a South
Carolina case. In March, 1961, nearly 200 students marched on the
South Carolina State House in a protest against discrimination. They
were ordered to disperse, and, on refusing to do so, were arrested on
charges of breach of the peace. In reversing their convictions, the
Supreme Court maintained that the demonstrators had been non-
violent, had not obstructed traffic, and had not provoked onlookers.
The Court said that "in arresting, convicting, and punishing the peti-
tioners . . . South Carolina infringed the petitioners' constitutionally
protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition
for redress of grievances." 6
By and large, then, the courts have interpreted the law so as to
provide considerable scope for direct action. There are, no doubt,
important limits, some of which have been suggested. But the over-all
tendency has been to make these limits fairly broad. It goes without
saying that avowed civil disobedience cannot be and has not been
sanctioned, for law violation could hardly be made legal. This does
not mean, however, that civil disobedience cannot be morally justified
-a question which will be discussed later.
Legitimacy: Moral
"Legitimacy" can also have moral connotations. That is to say,
whatever may be the positive law status of direct action, questions
may still be raised as to its justifiability in terms of postulated norms
of human conduct. A street demonstration or sit-in may be perfectly
legal, and yet rejected because it is intrinsically not right to parade
with banners or sit on restaurant stools where one is obviously un-
wanted. Some object to the coercive aspects of direct action, identify-
95 Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Cober v. Birmingham, 373 U.S.
374 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Green-
ville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
96 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). On legal problems of
direct action, see Ervin, Freedom of Assembly and Racial Demonstrations, 10 01Ev.-
MAR. L. Rev. 88 (1961); Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Prob-
lems of the First Sixty Days, 1960 Duxe L.J. 315; Rudman, Sitting-in on the Omnibus-
the 1961 Segregation Cases, 22 LAw nr TnAtsrToN 206 (1963); Schwelb, The Sit-in
Demonstrations: Criminal Trespass or Constitutional Right? 36 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 779
(1961); Comment, Sit-ins and State Action, 14 STA L. REv. 762 (1962). In its ruling
sustaining the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Harem
v. City of Rock Hill, 85 Sup. Ct. 384 (1964), the Supreme Court wiped out all pend-
ing prosecutions of direct action demonstrators. Some 3,000 demonstrators were affected
by the ruling. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1964. p. 1.
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ing all coercion with evil. During the presidential campaign of 1964
one of the candidates implied several varieties of criticism, although
he was usually rather vague, and suggested that direct action always
leads to violenceY In addition, it has been contended that direct
action cannot be justified unless and until all normal or regular chan-
nels of protest have been exhausted. 8
But it is difficult to see how propositions of this kind can be sus-
tained. By what standard of ultimate moral valuation can it be main-
tained that one should not walk in the streets or picket peaceably to
protest social wrong? Often, it would seem, objection arises because
the action may be unusual, or contrary to the social mores, or violative
of traditional middle-class conceptions of propriety. But the fact that
an action may be eccentric, against what has been done in the past,
or contrary to an habitual way of looking at right or wrong should
lead us simply to question the notion of identifying wrong with ec-
centricity or with rejection of what has been held to be good in the
past. To be sure, coercion may be entailed in direct action. But it is
involved, too, in all life and particularly in conflict situations. The
very point of non-violent direct action is to employ only those forms
of coercion which do not cause serious and irreparable injury and
which help re-open channels of communication and negotiation, for
those channels must be re-opened if violent forms of coercion are to be
avoided. Always the objective is negotiation and not sheer domina-
tion or victory.
As for the allegation that direct action cannot be justified until all
orthodox methods of protest have been employed, we need only point
out that the more respectable means have been used for a hundred
years-with only middling results. Most direct actionists, moreover, do
not rject legislation, judicial remedies, and education; they think of
them, indeed, as indispensable accompaniments of non-violent
resistance.
Questions of moral justifiability cannot, of course, be sharply
separated from those of efficacy. Motivations, means, and ends are
inter-related; and the test of consequences, as well as of intrinsic
character and motivation, is relevant. What can we say of the efficacy
9 7 In the speech which formally opened his presidential campaign, Senator Barry
Goldwater criticized Ambassador Adlai Stevenson for the latter's comment that a jail
record in the cause of civil rights might be a badge of honor. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,
1964, p. 12.
98 This argument is often directed against advocates of overt civil disobedience.
Frankel, Is It Ever Right To Break the Law?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964 (Magazine),
p. 36.
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of direct action as practiced in the struggle for integration? Assuming
that the goals sought-desegregation and non-discrimination-are
morally desirable and compatible with our entire scheme of values, has
direct action actually brought us closer to the goals without impairing
other normative commitments?
Efficacy
In assessing results of past direct action, a few preliminary observa-
tions are essential.
First, we should note the effect of the action not only on the ex-
ternal situation but also on the participants themselves. In some in-
stances, it may have done little to change the former but much to
prepare the latter for future struggle in terms of building morale, pro-
viding experience in organization, developing personal autonomy, and
stimulating greater social consciousness.
Second, it is always difficult to judge just how efficacious a given
device may be when it is used in a context of many other relevant
factors. It is never possible to prove with any certainty that in the
absence of non-violent demonstrations or resistance a given result
would or would not have ensued.
Third, as in judgments of all human affairs, we must always be
aware of the distinction between short-run and long-run consequences:
the former can, perhaps, be grasped in some measure, while the
latter are elusive, to say the least.
Keeping in mind these cautions, it would appear that preparations
for the March on Washington in 1941 were vital in compelling issuance
of the executive order banning discrimination in defense industries.
The evidence suggests that there was a direct relationship between
imminence of the march and Roosevelt's action.99 Whatever FDR's
reasons may have been, he had been loath to act decisively until con-
fronted with the adamant stand of Randolph, White, and their
followers.
It is much more difficult to assess actions like the 1963 March on
Washington. Between it and the final passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 a long period elapsed and during that time many other factors
undoubtedly helped influence the results, not excluding, perhaps, the
fear of violence which began to come to the fore early in 1964. Despite
the difficulty of estimating the effectiveness of the march, however, it
would be rash to assert that it had no impact on the development of
support for the bill. We may speculate that it did serve to demonstrate
99 See RucmAiws, LAw, JoBs Aim Poirrics 13-17 (1953).
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the unity which underlay many of the surface divisions of the move-
ment; and this, no doubt, was of political significance. Moreover, the
moral fervor of the demonstrators probably had an effect on legislators
who, while often dominated by rather narrow immediate considera-
tions, still were not immune to moral appeals.
Of even greater importance, perhaps, was the effect of the march
on its participants. It removed the sense of isolation under which many
of them had labored and hence strengthened their ability to carry out
other forms of direct action. Thus an acute observer quotes a Missis-
sippi farmer as saying: "I got a new charge. I never realized all of these
people were on my side."100 The fact that so many whites also partici-
pated greatly strengthened the morale of non-whites, who at times in
the past had often felt deserted. Co-operation of white churches was
especially significant, in view of the tardiness of ecclesiastical estab-
lishments in the past.
Martin Luther King points out that the march, if it did nothing
else, produced a fresh image of the Negro in the American mind: by
reason of its dramatic quality, the demonstration forced the mass
media to give it full coverage and conveyed to the general public a
glimpse of the new Negro. As King emphasizes, the picture was not
one of a "minstrel show, or a brawl, or a comic display of odd clothes
and bad manners." Instead, one obtained an impression of "dignity...
organization, . . . and friendly spirit."10 This was of enormous im-
portance in building up support for future integration efforts.
As for the sit-in and similar activities, while the immediate results
were mixed, on the whole they would appear to have had a rather
remarkable effect in promoting desegregation and helping establish
that "creative tension," as King has called it, 102 which is so essential if
negotiations are to be serious. Thus while the sit-in movement in Ala-
bama appeared to have had little overt effect after eighteen months of
effort, in Arkansas the establishment of a bi-racial committee and the
desegregation of Fort Smith were more or less attributed to efforts of
the direct actionists.03 In Florida, after about the same period of
effort, one or more establishments in fifteen different cities were de-
segregated; 0 4 in Georgia a bi-racial committee was established in
Savannah and some measure of desegregation in at least three cities; in
100 Boomm, BLAcK MAN's AmIucA 57 (1964).
101 YKNG, WHY WE CAN'T WArr 124 (1964).
102 Id. at 27-46. King characterizes non-violence as "the sword that heals."
10 3 Southern Regional Council Special Report, The Student Protest Movement:
A Recapitulation 4-5 (1961).
1o4 Id. at 6.
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Kentucky, bi-racial committees were set up in two cities and desegre-
gation accomplished in nine;10 5 and in Oklahoma, 116 eating places
were opened on a desegregated basis in Oklahoma City, with at least
five cities also affected. °0 Where little or nothing appeared to be ac-
complished, as in Mississippi and Alabama, the sit-inners had to deal
with much more deeply ingrained segregationist attitudes, and it was
clear that the struggle would have to be much longer and more in-
tense. By the autumn of 1961 lunch counters in more than 150 cities
had been desegregated as a result of sit-in activity. 07 This demon-
strates surely some measure of effectiveness.
With respect to boycotts and selective buying, results have de-
pended on adequacy of organization and extent of support. Where the
boycott was sustained, well-organized, and supported over a consider-
able period of time, as in Nashville, Tuskegee, and Birmingham, it was
undoubtedly an important factor in helping achieve less discriminatory
and weaker segregationist policies. Although the Montgomery bus
boycott did not directly bring about desegregation of buses in that
city-the desegregation being ordered by the courts-there is little
doubt that its effect in developing public opinion was an important
one, and that it would have produced desegregation eventually, even
if the courts had not acted.108
Assessment of the freedom rides is perhaps the most difficult of all.
They seem to have evoked a violence far greater than that associated
with sit-ins or boycotts and to have led in certain instances to a kind of
sit-down strike by many Southern policemen, who often tended to side
with the mobs.'0 9 On the other hand, it can be argued that without the
freedom rides, the national government would not have taken action
to fully implement the principle of desegregation in transportation
facilities. Although segregation in buses and other facilities had been
clearly ruled out by the courts, regulatory implementation by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission did not come until after the freedom
riders had challenged the actual pattern of segregation. By November
lo5 Id. at 7.
106 Id. at 10.
107 Estimate of Martin Luther King, The Time for Freedom Has Come, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 1961, (Magazine), p. 119.
108 The Nashville boycott, which began just before Easter, 1960, was particularly
effective, as some 98% of all Negroes refused to purchase from stores practicing dis-
crimination. These tactics, along with sit-ins, led to discrimination. LoMix, Tm NEcRo
REVOLT 130-31 (1962).
109 Thus a federal judge in Alabama found that a Montgomery Police Department
officer told a newspaper that the police "would not lift a finger to protect" the hated
outsiders. United States v. U.S. Kans, 194 F. Supp. 897, 900-01 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
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1, 1961, signs were being posted on interstate carriers stating that seat-
ing was to be "without regard to race, color, creed or national
origin," and an ICC order forbidding interstate carriers to use terminals
in which segregation was practiced'1 0 proved effective. In July, 1961,
open racial segregation was practiced in 97 of 294 bus terminals in 12
of 17 states examined"' but a survey in the same states showed that
after November 1 there were no segregated terminals. 12
In response to the charge of some "Northern liberals" that the free-
dom riders were "provocative intruders," Eugene V. Rostow defended
them in eloquent language: "First, the South is not making rapid
progress in the civil-rights field. Second, judicious intervention from
outside is needed now, as it has always been needed, to help South-
erners who believe in enforcing the Constitution to overcome the re-
sistance of those who do not... ."I's A British journal, commenting on
what it seemed to regard as the rather remarkable success of the
riders, stressed the fact that direct action had set in motion the wheels
of a legal machinery which all too often moved slowly and with little
effect." 4
As for the Birmingham situation of 1963, in which resistance was
pushed to the point of avowed civil disobedience, the immediate
results were rather significant and the long-run consequences perhaps
even more so. The leadership had been disappointed in results
obtained by a general campaign in Albany, Georgia," 5 and had con-
cluded that the difficulty had arisen because the objectives in Albany
had been too broad. Hence the decision was made to concentrate the
effort in Birmingham on the specific goal of desegregating lunch
counters." 6
Whether or not caused by the avowed civil disobedience, the im-
mediate results of the Birmingham campaign were of some moment.
They included an agreement, on May 10, 1693, to desegregate lunch
counters, rest rooms, fitting rooms, and drinking fountains within
ninety days after signing the pact. Negroes were to be hired and up-
graded in a non-discriminating way within sixty days. City officials
11049 C.F.R. § 180a (1961).
III Direct Action in the South, New South, Oct.-Nov. 1963, p. 8.
112 Ibid.
"13 Reporter, June 22, 1961, p. 18.
"14 Economist, June 10, 1961, p. 1110.
115 See ZnqN, ALBANy: A STuny in NATIONAL BESPONSIBILrY (1962); Cleghorn,
Epilogue in Albany, New Republic, July 20, 1963, p. 15. The voter registration drive
was highly successful. Walker, Achievement in Albany, New South, Oct.-Nov. 1963, p. 7.
1 6 Knxc, WaY WE CAN'T WAIT 54-55 (1964).
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were to co-operate in release of all those jailed. Finally, a regular sys-
tem of constant communication between Negroes and whites, some-
thing previously lacking in Birmingham, was to be set up. Although
Martin Luther King frankly admits that the results of the Birmingham
campaign left much to be desired, he also argues that the goal actually
achieved was, "considering the strength of the fortress," a "towering
achievement."117 This was so, he maintains, despite the violence of the
white segregationists that led to the action of President Kennedy in
sending 3,000 troops to overawe the provocateurs. Critics might ask
whether non-violent direct action helped provoke segregationist vio-
lence, and whether disciplined non-violence was not, therefore, rather
ironically, partly responsible for violence.
Even though questions of this kind might legitimately be raised,
we should not forget that strict non-violence, whether in the form of
civil disobedience or not, encouraged non-violent attitudes on the part
of defenders of the status quo. Thus in Albany, Georgia, before the
Birmingham affair, the police chief made a serious effort to overcome
the integrationist direct actionists by instructing his men to be non-
violent. And in Birmingham itself, any breach in the integrationists'
discipline of non-violence would surely have provoked far more vio-
lence than actually occurred. The critic, to be sure, might allege that
in the absence of any direct action campaign, no violence whatsoever
would have occurred. Conceivably this might have been true, if by
"violence" one means only immediate overt physical mistreatment. But
integrationists argued, and quite plausibly, that segregation customs
themselves enshrined a kind of covert violence against human beings;
a violence likely, moreover, to become overt at almost any moment.
Negroes were kept down by threats of police violence as well as by a
body of practices characterized by disrespect for human personality. In
utilizing non-violent direct action, the men of Birmingham were
attacking both the monumental violence of segregation and inequality,
and the idea that they could, by using violence, eliminate the injustice
of the status quo.
Efficacy of Direct Action, Conclusions
In general, we may say that direct action was remarkably effective,
particularly in certain contexts. It helped not infrequently to imple-
ment what was already law and to create sentiment for what, in the
eyes of egalitarians, ought to be law. It assisted greatly in undermining
customs which sustained segregation, even though it may have been
117 Id. at 114.
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only one element in a whole complex of factors responsible for change.
It helped reinforce the attitude of those whites who were receptive to
change, even though admittedly it may have antagonized other
whites.
It was least successful when it attempted to do too much during a
given campaign and most successful when its objectives were well-
defined and relatively limited. Although it had important positive
results in certain states of the Deep South, its major impact was in the
border states or in those only partly affected by the mainstream of the
Southern tradition. This did not mean that it did not have potential-
ities in states like Mississippi but rather that the struggle would be
prolonged in proportion to the strength of segregationist customs.
Although direct actionists were almost always non-violent in spirit
and deed, at points their actions appeared to furnish an excuse for,
or to evoke violence by, segregationists and their sympathizers. This
created a serious ethical issue in the minds of many proponents of
non-violent direct action, and led them to examine more closely the
context and possible consequences of their acts. There appeared to
be no simple answer, as each proposed campaign had problems
peculiar to itself.
While non-violent direct action was in part an expression of the
"new Negro" of twentieth century conditions, it was also profoundly
important in its psychological effects on participants. It helped pro-
mote solidarity and consciousness of common interests; it developed a
new sense of dignity and self-confidence. It enabled Negroes to express
long pent-up aggressive attitudes without developing the guilt feelings
which might otherwise have been aroused. It mediated, as one student
has put it, "between the conflicting traditions of the accommodating
Negro and the militant Negro."118 The same observer remarks that the
appeal of non-violence "looks in both directions, toward the suppres-
sion of hostility (the traditional approach), and toward its expression
in a militantly aggressive social movement." 19 In sum, non-violence
helped the Negro cease to be a slave.
Civil Disobedience and the Struggle for Equality
At several points we have encountered acts of deliberate and
avowed civil disobedience, notably in the Birmingham affair in which
protestors violated court injunctions. But we have not examined
'l8 Vander Zanden, The Non-Violent Resistance Movement Against Segregation,
68 Am. J. OF SocIoLoGY 547 (1963).
119 Id. at 549.
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closely the meaning and defense of civil disobedience, except in an
incidental way. In this section, we seek to define the term and to
inquire into its justification.
Meaning
Civil disobedience occurs when individuals, according to their own
admission, violate law publicly and non-violently in the name of a
principle.120 Here we employ "law" to include only expressions of
positive law: statutes, court orders, and administrative decrees or
orders under the authority of statutes or the Constitution. Participants
must believe that they are violating law; thus the freedom riders were
not civilly disobedient for the most part, since they thought that the
ordinances under which they were arrested were not positive law. The
civilly disobedient publicly avow their defiance, expect and sometimes
even hope for punishment, and usually notify the authorities; they are
thus to be sharply differentiated from secretive law evaders. Their
respect for life and personality places them in a category different from
that of violent direct actionists.' 1 Finally, they act in the name of an
ideal which is thought to involve the public weal, rather than a merely
selfish interest.
Acts of civil disobedience may occur in various contexts. Some-
times the law or order disobeyed is the one identified directly with the
grievance against which the protest is being made. On other occasions,
however, a law or ordinance normally not deemed offensive may be
violated in order to deal indirectly with a situation which apparently
cannot be attacked directly. Thus direct actionists may deliberately
occupy a legislative chamber illegally in order to protest absence of
action by the city council on fair housing or other proposed legislation;
or young men and women may chain themselves to the pillars of public
buildings, hoping for arrest, in order to protest lack of federal action in
Mississippi;1 22 or hundreds may deliberately occupy and block en-
trances to a large city hotel to force the hotel management to eliminate
alleged discrimination in hiring practices.' 23 In cases of this kind, the
law being violated had little if any direct connection with the condi-
12 0 See generally Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, 58 J. oF Pmosopny 661 (1961).
121 Violent direct actionists have been called "anarchists of the deed."
=N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1964, p. 35.
The incident occurred on the portico of the United States Court House 'at
Foley Square in New York City. Each chained demonstrator had a large letter
afxed to his mid-section, and together they spelled "Freedom Now." Expect-
ing and hoping to be arrested, the demonstrators were disappointed.
123 N.Y. Times, March 19, 1964, p. 23.
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tion deemed at fault; but actionists breached the law, nevertheless, in
the hope of calling public attention to a grievance. What may be con-
sidered a "direct connection" is, of course, a relative matter and we
must be wary of drawing hard and fast lines in classifying activities.
In Support of Civil Disobedience
Without attempting to trace out the whole history of attitudes to
civil disobedience (or acts similar to it), we may remark that Saint
Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century can be cited to sustain a
version of it; for although a law is usually binding in conscience and
must therefore be obeyed,2 4 if the law is evil intrinsically and either
orders commission of an evil act or forbids performance of a good one,
the citizen is under a moral obligation to disobey. 2 5 Saint Thomas
argues, moreover, that the right to disobey also arises when the ruler
has gained his authority illegally or when he abuses the general
authority he may legally possess.28 Earlier we have referred to the six-
teenth century de la Bo'tie, whose general principles would certainly
embrace the possibility of civil disobedience; and it is surely valid to
argue that those who justify tyrannicide'27 must also admit a right of
non-violent defiance. In the seventeenth century, neither Baptists nor
Quakers hesitated deliberately to disobey law under certain circum-
stances. And in the United States, the tradition stemming from
Thoreau and others'28 is well-known.
Despite the long history of the practice and theory of civil dis-
obedience, however, many leaders of American opinion have ques-
tioned its legitimacy or efficacy or both during the integration struggle.
Thus the late President Kennedy, in an address of September 30, 1962,
stated: "Americans are free ... to disagree with the law-but not to
disobey it."' 29 And during Martin Luther King's incarceration for civil
disobedience in 1963, eight fellow clergymen from Alabama ques-
tioned the wisdom and timeliness of his activities in Birmingham.8 0
Even among ardent desegregation leaders, civil disobedience was
looked upon with great suspicion, if not on grounds of alleged Me-
gitimacy, then on those of claimed imprudence. Thus an NAACP
124 Suma.n. ThEoLoGicA I-IT, Quest. 96, art. 4.
125 Ibid.
12 6 AQunINAs, CoM ENTARlY ON THE SENTENCES OF PETER LomJAu, II, Dist. 44,
Quest. 2, Art. 2.
127 E.g., JAszi & LEwis, AcAisT m TYRaNr (1957).
2 8 The authentic tradition stems from Jefferson.
120 N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 22.
130 Kn G, Wny WE CAN'T WArr 76-96 (1964).
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official told a Negro journalist during the Birmingham episodes that
"Negroes need to learn to respect the law, not to learn how to dis-
respect the law. Suppose white Americans refused en masse to respect
antisegregation laws?"18
In view of the long history of justification for and practice of civil
disobedience, it is difficult to understand the doubts expressed about
its legitimacy and, under certain circumstances, its possible expediency.
Here we summarize what appear to be the leading questions asked,
together with the answers which the defender of civil disobedience,
including the writer of this paper, would offer.
A basic attack on civil disobedience is grounded on the proposition
that men have an unqualified obligation to obey all positive law. Law
is so basic an ingredient in civilization and so essential for order, so
this argument goes (and it was repeated at the level of partisan oratory
by Senator Goldwater during the campaign of 1964),132 that the
slightest deviation from obedience is in effect an attack on civilization
itself and on the conditions which make culture possible.
A modified version of this absolutist principle-and perhaps the
one most current in the United States-is that while civil disobedience
may conceivably be justified in an "undemocratic" society, it cannot
possibly be defended in a "democratic" one. In the latter, the argument
goes, the machinery is open for change of the law; free speech and a
free press guarantee the debate so essential to change, and the judicial
tribunals are open to hear complaints. Civil disobedience is, therefore,
a morally illegitimate method, since other legally permissible and
efficacious remedies exist and the citizen has made an implicit agree-
ment to utilize them. Some such argument would seem to underly
statements like those of the late President Kennedy and certain officials
of the NAACP. Martin Luther King attempts to state what many were
undoubtedly thinldng during the civil disobedience of 1963: "Since
we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme Court's decision of
1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, at first glance it may
seem rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws." 88 How can
these asseverations be answered?
First we can point out that unless one assumes rulers to be infal-
lible, the laws and orders which they decree may on occasion be
morally questionable, even though their ethically dubious character
131 Boo=ER, BrAcx MA's AmmucA 53 (1964).
132 Referring to civil disobedience, Senator Goldwater said: "No one can in deep
conscience advocate lawlessness in seekdng redress of a grievance." N.Y. Times, Sept.
4, 1964, p. 12.
13s KneG, Letter from Birmingham Jail, in Wny WE CAN'T WArT 82 (1964).
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may not in itself lead one to disobey them. Whatever one's position
may be on the modern natural law controversy, both positivists and
natural lawyers agree that laws may be morally unjust, whether they
still retain the status of law (as with the positivists) or cease to be
law (as with the natural lawyers ).134
If, then, one admits that legislators may err and may command
unjust acts or forbid just ones, there would seem to be no good reason
for denying the possible legitimacy of civil disobedience. At the very
least, one can say that it cannot be excluded. Once one grants that
positive law and justice may not coincide, a conflict of loyalties arises,
as Sophocles' Antigone well knew: should one obey the commands of
"nature" or "morality," on the one hand, or of the political ruler, on the
other? In answering the question, one must, of course, weigh one set
of values and factual judgments against another, in the light of one's
over-all world outlook; and this can be an extremely painful task. But
however difficult the effort, it would surely have to consider civil dis-
obedience as one alternative.
If civil disobedience is the choice, does the civilly disobedient
person show disrespect for law, as is sometimes alleged? On the
contrary, it may be weightily argued, he shows great respect for
positive law. He disobeys publicly, accepts the penalty attached, and
takes legal commands seriously. Far from showing contempt for the
law, the very deliberation with which he violates it indicates his high
regard for the legal order in general. His is an act of confrontation
rather than evasion. When integration leaders have engaged in civil
disobedience, they have done so only after long and serious self-
examination in which the value of law observance has been given very
high priority."3 5 It is no exaggeration to say that, for the most part,
those who have committed civil disobedience have shown greater
respect for the claims of law than the vast number of citizens (not to
speak of administrators) who obey law rather mechanically and with-
out thought or who disobey it for immediate personal advantage, e.g.,
in running traffic lights when no policemen are around, or as a result of
social and class pressures.
Basic regard for law and order as important values of civilization
cannot be developed unless and until men are willing constantly to
criticize particular laws and even, on occasion, conscientiously to
134 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to La--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAv.
L. RBv. 630, 672 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HAnV. L. REv. 593, 602-21 (1958); MacGuigan, Civil Disobedience and Natural Law,
52 Ky. L.J. 2, 346 (1964).
1=5 KiNG, WHY WE. CAN'T WArr 70-71 (1964).
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disobey them. In the long run, fidelity to law can be assured only if
given individual laws do not run counter to man's moral insights. The
doctrine of "superior orders" enunciated by the Niiremberg defendants
is calculated to produce an ethic of expediency rather than one of
principle, of cynicism rather than seriousness about law; and fidelity is
eroded by expediency and undermined by cynicism. Paradoxically, we
may suggest, principled obedience to law will be strengthened only to
the degree that principled disobedience is accepted, under certain
circumstances, as a moral imperative. Automatic obedience is not the
act of a human being having moral responsibility, but instead reflects
a robot-like position of indifference to the law's substance and, like
compulsive or irrational disobedience, repudiates important objectives
of civilized life-the development of sensitivity in the realm of moral
and political obligation and the encouragement of reason.
As for the objection that civil disobedience is not permissible in
a democratic society, much depends, of course, on how one interprets
"democratic." If one associates the term with the right and opportunity
to vote, equality of opportunity, speedy justice, equitable distribution
of power, freedom of expression, access to the material means of ex-
pression, constitutional government, and majority rule, it is almost
superfluous to point out that no such regime is ever approximated in
the actual historical situation. Even if one assume, in other words, that
claims to the moral right of civil disobedience would be absent in a
democratic society (and we shall not contest this assertion here,
although it may well be *questioned), it is sufficient to point out that
neither the United States nor any other modern nation can be said to
be near the ideal. This is particularly true if one looks at the actual
status of minorities like the Negroes in American society. Their relative
economic power does not begin to compare with that of the whites,
they have been until recently virtually excluded from the franchise,
they are subjected to color discrimination in almost every area of col-
lective existence, their churches have been bombed,3 6 their chances of
being sent to prison or the electric chair are much greater than those
of whites, 31 and their subjection to police brutality has been
136 See, e.g., 1961 CO?,'?N ON CIr Rir rs REP., JusTIcE; Southern Regional
Council Special Report, Law Enforcement in Mississippi (1964).
.37 Thus MaURAL, AN AmucA D mwnMA, 554 n.b. (1962 ed.), quotes an un-
published study by Arthur Raper: "In 10 Southern states, for varying periods, 975
Negroes and 464 whites were sentenced to death. The Negro constitutes less than 30
per cent of the population in these states, but has more than twice as many death
sentences imposed. Actual executions make the racial differential still greater, for 60.9
percent of the Negro death sentences were carried out as compared with 48.7 of the
white:"
[Vol. 16
DIRECT ACTION AND INTEGRATION
notorious. 8" In some parts of the United States, in fact, we have what
the historian James W. Silver calls a "closed society.""'9 As Silver has
correctly pointed out, "for nearly ninety years Mississippi has grimly
nullified the federal Constitution"140 and has centered its whole ideol-
ogy on the notion of white supremacy. And Martin Luther King, in
connection with the Birmingham civil disobedience, has remarked that
the judicial injunction has been a favorite device in Southern states to
forbid what would in other circumstances be perfectly legal forms of
protest.141
Under conditions of this kind, any criticism of civil disobedience
on the ground that it is inadmissible under a "democracy" is surely
invalid. A society which does not recognize a very high proportion of
its population as full members cannot legitimately expect or demand
recognition of a moral obligation to obey all its laws.
Even if one admit that in the long run the Negro will gain equality
without use of "extreme" measures, what is to happen to the status of
the Negro in the short run? In the long run, the present generation will
be dead; and this provides a sense of urgency for the slogan "Freedom
Now." Rationalizations for inequality have persisted, both North and
South, for some three hundred years and during this long period most
Negroes have been astonishingly patient. From the viewpoint of this
paper, they should have turned long ago to civil disobedience. Even
now they are sometimes too loath to consider it.
Far from defending simply the moral right of civil disobedience,
we should perhaps lay greater stress on the obligation to disobey. The
notion of right seems to imply a claim against government or society.
Obligation, by contrast, suggests a duty to others or to civilization:
the accent is on the positive, the negation becoming merely incidental.
Thus we may have an obligation to enhance the welfare of mankind
and to promote equality and this may entail, in turn, the duty of civil
disobedience: the disobedience appears negative but it is strictly
subordinate to the broader and more comprehensive positive obliga-
138 1961 Cozf'N ON CrvIL RIGrs REP., JusTicE 5-28. Th6 Commission report
concludes, at 27: "The statistics suggest that Negroes feel the brunt of official brutality
proportionately more than any other group in American society.... [Almong the com-
plaints of police brutality received by the Department of Justice in the two and one
half year period ending June 30, 1960, the alleged victims were Negroes (who con-
stitute approximately 10 percent of the total population) in 35 percent of the cases
and whites 38 percent of the cases; in 27 percent of the cases the race of the victim
was unknown."
189 Surnva, Mississipi: TE CLosED Socsury (1964).
140 Id. at 11.
141 KING, WHY WE CAN'T WArr 70 (1964).
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tion. The obligation to disobey under proper circumstances must be
seen as having an ethical claim on us like the moral imperative of
obedience. The obligation to disobey the earthly city flows from our
duty to obey the heavenly community.
All this is not to say that civil disobedience is always desirable,
expedient, or efficacious. The possibility of violence must certainly be
weighed, as Martin Luther King did in Birmingham, when he is said
to have remarked: "I want 5,000 supporters, not 10,000, because I don't
believe that there are that many non-violent Negroes in this city."'4
It would also seem incumbent on us, following traditional natural law
casuistry, to take into consideration the nature of the objective to be
gained: means, particularly where they involve such issues as dis-
obedience to law, must surely be proportionate to ends. Finally, it
would appear reasonable to give the benefit of the doubt to the law;
the burden of proof'must rest on those who would deliberately violate
the statute or order.143 This follows from the proposition that law
observance ought to occupy a relatively high position in any system of
civilized values.
It should be fully realized that even with these cautions observed,
there may be those who utilize civil disobedience for ends which we
may not approve. Thus during the autumn of 1964, large numbers of
parents boycotted certain New York City schools or illegally occupied
school buildings in protest against busing of their children to inte-
grated schools..44 Once one accepts the notion that civil disobedience
may be morally legitimate, it is evident that judgments as to when it
is appropriate and prudent will vary. But this is in the nature of the
problem. The alternative could only be absolutist or near absolutist
positions, and these we have rejected. The absolutist attitude would
entail far greater moral and prudential risks than the viewpoint
defended here.
On the whole, the integration movement has not been rash in its
use of civil disobedience. In instances where its employment might be
seriously questioned, one will generally find that the leadership was
not thoroughly familiar with the theory and practice of non-violence.
Usually civil disobedience is most questionable when it involves dis-
142 BoomER, BLAcn MA's AmEIcA 53 (1964).
143 For elaborations of the justification for civil disobedience, see Bedau, supra note
120; Brown, Civil Disobedience, 58 J. OF PHmOSOPHY 22, 669-81 (1961); Cohen,
Essence and Ethics of Civil Disobedience, Nation, March 16, 1964, p. 257; Frankel,
Is It Ever Right To Break the Law? N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1964 (Magazine), p. 17;
MaeGuigan, supra note 134.
144 N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1964, p. 1, and Oct. 7, 1964, p. 1.
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obeying a law having virtually no connection with the goal of integra-
tion, e.g., violating a traffic law in New York or San Francisco. Those
familiar with the principles of non-violence will recognize this; those,
on the other hand, who are new to the movement often will not.145
All this would seem to emphasize once more the need for careful
study of the theory of non-violence before one attempts its practice.
The Future of Direct Action and Civil Rights
The burden of this paper has been that non-violent direct action
theories, strategies, and tactics as used in the integration struggle have
carried on a long tradition. This in itself does not justify them. In-
dependently of their fitting into the tradition, however, they can be
supported: most of them have been within the bounds of law, as
usually understood; have been more in conformity with religious and
humanitarian moral standards than many other methods of social
struggle; and have had, with some exceptions, a fairly high degree of
success. That success has been dual: it has helped move us closer to
the ideal of equality and, of like importance, it has greatly assisted in
overcoming inertia, apathy, and compulsive subordination in the
Negro himself. Even where direct action has been expressed as avowed
civil disobedience, there has usually been moral as well as prudential
justification for it.
Although the critic of non-violent direct action will no doubt point
out that its effectiveness depends in a measure on the existence of cer-
tain favorable factors in the objective situation, and that in some
instances it had to be assisted by judicial and administrative decisions,
the defender will emphasize that without direct action a number of the
favorable factors might not have been present and that a proportion of
the laws might have gone unimplemented. The defender does not see
it as the only element in the struggle for integration but rather as one
among many; and the many will assuredly include education, litiga-
tion, legislation, and others.146
Direct action will probably be very much needed in the future.
145 There can never be any guarantee, of course, that leaders familiar with the
principles of non-violent direct action may not make serious errors of judgment in this
as well as other matters.
146 See Wilkins, Freedom Tactics for 18,000,000, New South, Feb. 1964, p. 3; Cook,
Revolution and Responsibility, New South, Feb. 1964, p. 8. Cook says, at 11, "[W]e
must use many methods: Conferences, informal conversations, negotiations, the courts,
selective buying, education, political power, direct action, fire under the feet." King
and others also stressed the multiplicity of approaches: within limits of the thoroughly
non-violent ethic, it is never either, or, but rather both, and.
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Despite achievement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and similar legisla-
tion, what Negroes increasingly call the white power structure is still
firmly entrenched in some areas. Although formal statutory provisions
are not to be minimized, their implementation may require continued
use of direct action strategies, for the wheels of legal enforcement often
move slowly and with great difficulty. Just as the freedom riders
helped put into effect interstate bus desegregation, so future direct
actionists may have to stimulate and supplement the sometimes slug-
gish labors of national and state administrators. 1'4 7 Although the slogan
of the integration movement has been "Freedom Now," a realistic ap-
praisal would seem to show that many years of work remain to be
done. In accomplishing this, direct action, not excluding civil dis-
obedience, can play an important role.
147 That sluggish administrators and apathetic citizens need to be and can be
aroused through direct action was demonstrated anew in Selma, Alabama, where
dramatic events from January to March, 1965 promised to help break up old patterns
and develop new ones. These events occurred after the statement in the text was written
and were the first startling exemplifications of direct action since the informal election
truce of 1964.
The Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee had begun its voter registration
drive in Selma in February, 1963, believing that the area was one of the most difficult
in the South to "break open." In January, 1965, the efforts of SNCC were strengthened
when the Southern Christian Leadership Conference decided to employ various forms
of non-violent direct action and to wage an all-out campaign. The training of Negroes
in methods of demanding electoral rights was stepped up and mass demonstrations were
carefully planned. On February 16, a young Negro civil rights worker, Jimmie Lee
Jackson, was murdered during a demonstration in Marion, a town near Selma. Early in
March, scores of white and Negro sympathizers poured into Selma from all parts of the
United States to reinforce the direct action and to stage a march from Selma to the
state capital in Montgomery. The march was halted by the use of what many thought
were extremely brutal methods. Another more limited demonstration took place on
March 9. On the evening of that day, three white ministers who had taken part in the
demonstration were beaten by four white men. One of the ministers, the Rev. James J.
Reeb, died shortly after being taken to the hospital. His death evoked an international
as well as a national wave of sympathy and strengthened the will of the non-violent
resisters.
After the death of" Reeb, it was almost certain that Selma's climate would be altered
in many respects. As Dick Cunningham, a Minneapolis Tribune staff writer, observed:
"The hope of Selma residents that they could return to 'just going about our business
the way we want to' was dashed" by Reeb's murder, as well as by other episodes in
Selma. Minneapolis Tribune, March 12, 1965, p. 1.
Direct action in Selma, with its consequences, exemplified many of the character-
istics associated with non-violence at its best. Preparation was careful and the partici-
pants highly motivated and well disciplined. The objective-expanded voter registration-
was relatively simple, widely understood, and fully accepted. Physical attacks on
demonstrators, whether official or private, seemed to have even less justification than
usual; and the non-retaliation of the non-violent resisters therefore stood out sharply by
contrast. Finally, the martyrs of the struggle virtually epitomized the ideal of non-
violence.
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And in this judgment about the future, we have not implied more
than raising the level of the Negro minority to full conventional
"equality." We have not even called attention to such issues as over-all
distribution of social and economic power. For the most part, the goals
of the civil rights movement thus far have seemed to be formal de-
segregation and integration into the basic structure of an American
society which remains very mucl what it is today. It has often been
pointed out that the ethos of the movement has been a "middle class"
one: give the Negro the same status as the white, so to speak, with
class and income differentiation similar to that of the white com-
munity. Raise the average economic well-being of the Negro to that
of the average white man, but do not touch the way in which economic
power as a whole is distributed.
But is this goal, remote as it is today, comprehensive enough? Even
assuming that racial discrimination were entirely removed, the average
Negro income that of the average white, and the distribution of income
in the Negro community about the same as among whites, economic
discrimination would still exist: thus a man, Negro or white, with low
income and six children would find himself discriminated against in
housing as contrasted with a man, Negro or white, with high income
and six children; yet the basic need might be roughly the same. Should
one of the objectives of Negro direct action in the future be to show us
the way to eliminate economic distinctions as well as racial ones?
Should it attempt to point the way to an economy bottomed on dis-
tribution of basic essentials (like housing) in accordance with need
rather than monetary income? These are questions which might well
be asked, but they would take us beyond Negro-white segregation and
discrimination into yet another field where men are alienated from one
another in equally dramatic and arbitrary fashion.
Returning to the problem of race discrimination and segregation,
we conclude by noting two important questions which must be faced
by exponents of non-violence in the future. The first involves the in-
dispensability of imagination and flexibility if direct action is to con-
tinue to be useful. The second concerns the danger that advocates of
violence may come to dominate the integration movement.
If direct actionists in the future should simply build mechanically
on the past and lose their flexibility, non-violence could easily cease to
be effective. As new situations arise, novel expressions of non-violent
resistance must be tried-and this requires great imagination. How, for
example, can it be used in Northern Cities, where thus far it has been
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only rarely tried on a large scale?148 How can it be employed effec-
tively in helping to enlarge economic opportunity? Or can it? The
lunch counters and buses will have been desegregated. Will advocates
of non-violent direct action be able to move into other fields? The
answers to questions of this kind are not wholly clear.
As for the second question, certain "revolutionary" critics in the
integration movement increasingly seem to be maintaining that non-
violence is tame and equivocating, whereas violence might be a tool
for more rapid progress. This mood is described, even if not condoned,
in the writings and other utterances of such men as James Baldwin149
and Louis Lomax.150 The latter has been quoted as saying: "Martin
Luther King wrapped his dream in love, and while it was ricocheting
between Lookout Mountain in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the Gulf
of Mexico, it turned into a nightmare. [Now] wild, new, strange voices
have moved into the leadership vacuum and we are headed for blood-
shed and chaos."l'5
Conclusion
Actually, of course, it is non-violent resistance that is the revolu-
tionary force. Violence is reactionary and stultifying. Even if we can
148 One can, of course, cite examples of large-scale demonstrations in Northern
cities. In San Francisco, "more than 1000 chanting, marching, sitting, door-blocking
demonstrators carried out a tumultous all-night siege of the Sheraton Palace Hotel,"
on March 6, 1964. Their objective was to change the alleged discriminatory hiring
practices of the Palace and other hotels in San Francisco. Hundreds were arrested, and
the demonstrations, along with several others, led to serious controversy over methods
of civil rights demonstrations. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1964, p. 23. The San Francisco
affair illustrates many problems which will inevitably confront advocates of direct
action. One can ask, "Where does non-violence end and violence begin?" See also Peter
Kihss, Blockades in New York, in WEsTiN, FBunnom Now 275-76 (1964).
1 4 9 BALDwiN, ANoTHER CouNTRY (1962). The author sees the Negro as having
an inevitable bitter hostility against the white man, however friendly their personal
relations may seem. See also, BALDwiN, THE FinE NEXT Tnm (1963).
180 See also Jencks, Mississippi: From Conversion to Coercion, New Republic, Aug.
22, 1964, p. 17.
151 N.Y. Times, April 19, 1964, p. 9. See also Bnx & HAmus, THE NEGRo Rnvo-
LuTiON 3N A mnncA 73 (1964), in which the authors point out, "nearly two-thirds of
the rank and file and almost all of the leaders" of Negroes in the civil rights struggle
are "pinning their hopes on nonviolence." But in the authors' judgment, the most sig-
nificant response to their questionnaire was that 22% of rank-and-file Negroes and
25% of non-South slum dwellers think that some violence will be inevitable. Roughly
five million followers of the Negro leadership "are resigned to the possibility that they
may have to fight their way to freedom."
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imagine a superficially "successful" military revolt of civil rights
egalitarians, we must at the same time envision the problems which
the new government would confront. It would be faced with the threat
of revenge-seeking whites and would therefore be compelled to estab-
lish repressive measures of all kinds. In the frantic effort to retain power,
it would have to establish a new and perhaps more onerous form of
segregation-that between the militarily dominant ruling class, pre-
sumably largely Negro in leadership, and millions of whites bent on
retaliation. The mutual trust which complete integration requires
would thus be undercut from the beginning by violent revolution.
Non-violence, by contrast, provides methods which, while they
may shock defenders of the status quo initially, in the long run help
establish an atmosphere for the reconciliation so essential if integration
is to be more than nominal. Although non-violence may indeed be
coercive, as we have suggested, it also opens the way for improved
communication and thus for the development of a community of in-
terests and understanding.
From the viewpoint of immediate future strategy, moreover, we
should remember that nothing would please desperate segregationists
and some members of the white power structure more than to have
Negroes repudiate non-violent direct action in favor of violence; for, in
that event, all the repressive mechanisms of "law enforcement" could
and probably would be turned against Negroes with an air of great
moral justification.
It is to be hoped that integrationists, whether leaders or masses,
will not fall prey to the false promises of violence, but instead will
imaginatively develop the means of non-violent direct action. In so
doing, they will undoubtedly best serve the cause of integration and
equality; for non-violent direct action avoids the pitfalls of acqui-
escence and submission, on the one hand, and the equally great pitfall
of violence, on the other. Already the civil rights movement has con-
tributed enormously to our store of experience on the uses of non-
violence, and its contributions in the future can be equally great.
At stake is not merely the future of civil rights and race equality
in the United States but also, in some sense, the possibility of world
peace. The civil rights movement, in its employment of non-violence,
can help point the way to development of non-violent power as an
alternative to military methods of national defense in a day when the
latter are quite obviously virtually useless15 2 as well as immoral. Al-
152 See Walter Millis, The Uselessness of Military Power, in AnEmicA ARMED 22-42
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though the immediate concern must no doubt continue to be the hard
and long road to equality in the United States, those who travel that
road can be fortified for the struggle if they keep in mind the broader
vision as well.
(Goldwin ed. 1963). That a leading student of military affairs should speak of the
"uselessness" of military power is itself significant. To many observers, one of the puzzles
of the American scene in the fifties and sixties of the twentieth century has been the
absence of close working relations between the civil rights and peace movements.
